Iraq: It's Not Over 'til it's Over by Adam Khatib

American intervention in Iraq has failed to establish a stable, democratic Iraq. This statement cannot be denied. However the notion, proposed by members of the Democratic Congress including current presidential frontrunners Hilary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama, that removing American forces from the situation will come to improve the situation for Iraqis is an inherent absurdity. Scheduled withdrawal dates and caps on troop levels spell disaster for the future of Iraq.

The plan presented by President Bush calls for increased troop involvement in the mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad in which Sunni and Shia temperaments have turned towards abhorrent levels of violence. In order to stem the bloodshed, the plan calls for an American troop increase of approximately 22,000 soldiers and Marines. These added forces will help to halt levels of violence thereby improving the ability of Iraqi politicians to carry out the bargaining processes needed to settle current sectarian differences. Crucial to solving these disagreements is the creation of a constitutional agreement regarding the sharing of funds from oil revenue between the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish populations.

There is no guarantee that this plan will succeed. Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq would likely be better served by a number closer to 30,000 additional soldiers in order to improve security for the Iraqi people, raising the number of troops currently in Iraq to approximately 170,000. This number, combined with Iraqi and private security forces, will bring the ratio of soldiers per Iraqi civilians close to numbers necessary to effectively battle insurgent forces. In addition, the current increase must be properly managed and sustained for a long enough period as to allow security to take hold, likely a period of 12-18 months. This will certainly have a greater chance of success than leaving inadequate troop levels as they are.

According to the updated counterinsurgency manual, coauthored by newly appointed Multinational Force Iraq commander General Patraeus, minimal troop numbers for security and trust-building operations should be set at 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants. Such was the case in 2005 in the northern Iraqi city of Tal Afar in which American forces under the Col H.R. McMaster were able to institute a “clear, hold, and build” strategy. After clearing the city of insurgent forces, American forces stayed and maintained a daily security presence on the streets while at the same time working to rebuild damaged infrastructure. Such measures focus on stability and gaining the trust of residents. Such measures can only be successful if adequate levels of troops are available to apply them.

Deep-seeded sectarian rifts have undeniably widened in recent months bringing increasing levels of violence. What is certain however is that a withdrawal of American forces in the current lack of instability will fail to bring law, order and democracy to Iraq. What withdrawal will do is increase the rate of a descending spiral into death and destruction. The oft-cited Baker Hamilton report, though calling for a phased withdrawal of American forces, itself notes this grim fact.

In order to have any chance of success, American commanders must be able to evaluate and control the levels of troops needed on a mission specific basis. Setting a troop-level cap would tie the hand of General Petraeus and leave current forces stretched far to thin to accomplish security tasks. Setting troop withdrawal schedules serves only to eliminate any American encouragement for compromise between the Shia, Kurds, and Sunnis.

Abandoning Iraq would likely lead to one of a series of disturbing outcomes. One is a failed Iraqi state, subject to the vying whims of its neighbor nation states. Such an Iraq would be a continually devastated nation in which sectarian violence and terrorism are the perpetual and inevitable way of life. Another outcome is a partitioned Iraq in which the creation of vying Sunni, Shia and Kurdish states is marred by violence over oil resources. Yet another possibility is an Iraq in which the majority Shia government, perhaps under the influence of Iran, fully endorses the wholesale slaughter of the Sunni minority. None of these options are acceptable outcomes for the US or Iraqi interests on the whole. Of course these outcomes are not the only possible ones, however what is impossible is a magical transition towards a viable political arrangement if America leaves Iraq in its current situation.

The idea that removal of US troops will force Malaki into compromise is counter-intuitive at best. Pulling out American troops, as advocated under the guise of “redeployment” or “phased withdrawal” by Senate Democrats such as Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama, would not have the desired effect. It would leave the legitimate Iraqi government and people mercy to the throes of a full-fledged civil war. Skyrocketing levels of violence far greater than any amounts that have been previously experienced are the likely outcome.

It is not too late for the situation in Iraq to improve. The fatalistic notion that Iraq is a lost cause and that there is no solution for the Iraqi government and people is tantamount only to casting the Iraqis into doom. It is absolutely necessary that Iraqis create compromise and change for themselves. America cannot accomplish these tasks. What America can do is set the stage for the necessary political process to take place. If security levels are increased and the Iraqis still fail to agree to compromise, continuation of civil war will be inevitable and it will be time for American forces to leave. At this point there is still an opportunity for compromise, and as long as there is a possibility, American forces still have a role to play.