The Heat War: Russian Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalization by Daniel Koehler

As the saying would have it, you can’t teach an old dog new tricks. Vladimir Putin would beg to differ. The former KGB spy and current Russian president seems to maintain a residual Cold War mentality while using original and creative approaches to adapt to a world of economic interdependence and high energy costs. In January 2006, the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom, known for its close ties to the Kremlin, cut off gas supplies to Ukraine after the latter refused to accept a dramatic rise in prices to global market levels. Later that same year, pipelines supplying gas to Georgia were mysteriously blown up with no evidence of terrorist involvement. Coincidentally, both countries had recently replaced Soviet-era apparatchiks with more Western-oriented politicians. Under Putin’s stewardship, Moscow has also gone on to forge closer ties with several regimes in the Middle East and Latin America. In short, Putin’s objective seems to be control over his “near abroad,” or former Soviet republics, while expanding Russia’s sphere of influence elsewhere. His tool is these countries’ dependency on Russia’s economic or political patronage.

While the objectives of Russian foreign policy are likely to remain unchanged at least until Putin presumably steps down in 2008, the tools that are used cannot. The threat of raising the price of gas to Ukraine to market levels bore weight only because these market levels are currently so high. Natural gas cannot feasibly be transported in large quantities except through pre-existing pipelines, and Russia does have the advantage of an extensive network. But as new pipelines are built, Russia’s position stands to be compromised. Hence, we see Moscow taking steps to increase the dependency of former Soviet republics on Russian gas. Gazprom recently offered Armenia discount prices for Russian gas in exchange for control over part of its pipeline network, including those pipelines that bring in gas from Iran. Now that Gazprom has control over gas coming into Armenia from Iran as well as Russia, and given recent events in Georgia and the Ukraine, Yerevan may think twice before contravening Moscow’s wishes.

Some, however, have pointed to the recent dispute between Russia and Belarus as evidence that Gazprom’s actions are not driven by political considerations. Belarus’ president, Alyaksandar Lukashenka, has traditionally maintained close ties with Moscow, and negotiations had been in progress to establish a consolidation of the two nations into a single state. As these observers note, this did not prevent Gazprom from raising the price demanded for gas sold to Belarus in January of this year. But this logic is questionable, to say the least. If Gazprom’s actions really were based purely on economic motives, then why did we not see a simultaneous price hike for all the Soviet successor states paying below-market rates, as opposed to the consecutive and separate raises we have actually seen? Why, for that matter, were some of these countries offered below-market rates in the first place? It seems far more likely that Gazprom’s threats to Belarus were an attempt to mask the political motivations of its earlier energy policy, especially in light of the criticism leveled by several Western governments following the Ukraine affair.

Well disguised it may be, but this tactic of “energy diplomacy” is not a foolproof strategy. Turkey has a far-reaching network of gas pipelines, and could potentially be the missing link between gas-abundant Iran and gas-hungry Eastern Europe. This would spell trouble for Russia as it seeks to flex its geopolitical muscles, and so we have recently seen attempts at alternative measures. In flagrant disregard of EU and US policy, Putin invited several Hamas leaders to Moscow for discussions soon after the group was voted in. Moscow has also been heavily involved in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, at one point offering a deal to enrich uranium on Russian soil for transport back to Iran. In July, Moscow renewed a contract with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in which it agreed to continue selling the South American nation fighter jets, helicopters and assault rifles. Interestingly, all of these governments are known for their vehemently anti-American positions.

This could be interpreted as a move away from the Russian use of energy resources as a foreign policy tactic, or even as a training ground for Putin to try out a new political approach in the international arena. But it is more likely evidence of the true nature of his general style of foreign policy. Moscow’s attitude to Western governments is indifferent at best, as demonstrated by its willingness to deny Germany and Poland oil without prior consultation in the wake of the dispute with Belarus, and Putin is an opportunist. His goal of creating a Russian sphere of influence is facilitated by the perseverance of anti-Western regimes that are lacking in economic and political resources.

Since Hamas took power, the Palestinian Authority has been deprived of aid from the European Union and United States, one of its major sources of funding. Iran has been penalized by the UN Security Council with economic sanctions for its uranium enrichment program, and Venezuela has been largely isolated by the United States, the regional hegemon. By offering assistance, Putin is reasserting Russia’s presence on the international stage by making these countries dependent on Russian assistance, in the same way as Ukraine, Georgia and indeed Belarus are dependent on Russian gas. Naturally, the potential to deny Ukrainians and Georgians gas supplies in the freezing winter has a more immediate and more tangible effect than offering a helping hand to alienated rentier states, and the ability to use it with neighboring countries is, from Putin’s point of view, an opportunity too good to miss. But should the opportunity to use this political lever fail Vladimir Putin, we may rest assured that he will find alternative means to establish his international authority.