As the world’s attention focuses on Iraq, it is easy to forget about Afghanistan. As a struggling state whose nation building efforts are mired in a myriad of problems, some thought Afghanistan was a done deal after the fall of the Taliban. After all, the US “doesn’t do” state-building, according to George W. Bush before the Afghanistan invasion.
But that is exactly what the US, NATO and the Afghani government are trying to do, with limited results. Afghanistan has made remarkable headway in developing democratic institutions since the fall of the Taliban, yet many significant obstacles persist in its development. The most significant problem is a resurgent Taliban that has increased attacks on US-NATO forces in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. The porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border not only led to the escape of Osama bin Laden and his cohorts, but continues to allow the Taliban to crossover into friendly areas of Pakistan to use as a haven.
Hamid Karzai, the president of Afghanistan, is frustrated with President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan for signing a deal with tribal/Taliban leaders of North Wazirisitan, an area of Pakistan that shares a border with Afghanistan. The deal states that Pakistani security will ease border checkpoints, release some militants, and generally observe a cease-fire. In return, the Taliban would stop cross border attacks into Afghanistan.
Since the fall of the Taliban government, the US has put pressure on Pakistan to fight these rebels yet Pakistani security forces have been unsuccessful due to the tenacity of the Taliban and their ability to find sanctuary in the mountainous border region. Furthermore, there seems to be a general reluctance amongst Pakistan security forces to fight the Taliban and their supporters as the ISI, Pakistan’s infamous intelligence agency, had backed the Taliban regime when it was in power. A recently publicized paper written by an officer of Britain’s Defence Academy condemns the ISI for continuing support of the militant group. The new North Waziristan deal will lead to what Karzai fears most: a region where the Taliban can build up forces for cross border attacks along an even more fluid border through which not only militants can pass, but also the illegal drugs that finance them. In sum, the deal evidences the failure to win militarily against a guerilla group using the means of conventional warfare, a reality the US is realizing in Iraq. Consequently, new and creative means must be implemented to disrupt the Taliban’s activities and provide incentives to dissuade people from aiding the militant group. Part of the solution may lie in co-opting the Taliban’s main source of funding: opium.
Afghanistan produces 92% of the world’s opium, which continues to fund the Taliban. Insofar as the Taliban and armed drug lords benefit most from the illicit narcotic trade, opium production and poppy cultivation become intimately tied to the problem of insurgency and crime. The US is still using the blunt instrument of crop eradication to fight drug production; such tactics have failed and continue to fail, most noticeably in Latin America. The US has contracted DynCorp International, also reportedly involved in the drug war in Latin America and in training the Iraqi and Afghani security forces, to eradicate poppy fields in Afghanistan. However eradication programs hit the poor and not the criminal gangs and the Taliban who profit most from the drug trade. In fact, such programs may perpetuate the very evils the US government wishes to eliminate.
According to the Senlis Council, a Brussels-based think tank, Afghanis are increasingly joining or indirectly aiding the Taliban due to US-led poppy eradication efforts. The US needs to abandon this ham handed approach. Johann Hari, a columnist for The Independent, advocates the termination of eradication programs and in their place set up a system in which western governments purchase Afghani poppy seeds and sell them to pharmaceutical companies to make legal opiate based painkillers. Hari cites the success of a historical precedent in which Turkey effectively became a supplier for legal opiate-based medicines in the 1970s. Such a solution may be plausible but would also have to be accompanied by fostering job growth for the numerous other people involved in the drug trade. If the poppy purchase plan were to be implemented, the various conduits in the drug trafficking chain would be left jobless, angry, and armed. Without further employment opportunities, the government would risk a stronger coalition of drug gangs and a Taliban prepared to topple the Afghani government to regain their previous power.
Job growth would not only ameliorate the conditions that militants capitalize on for recruitment, but is essential for a stable society. Some progress has been made on the economic front. For instance, Coca Cola has opened a bottling plant in Kabul that provides 350 jobs, the largest telecommunications company in Afghanistan, Roshan, partly owned by the American firm MCT, is making profits. Future prospects include the 3M Corporation contracting distributors in Afghanistan and the dairy company, Land O’Lakes, was commissioned by USAID to revitalize Afghanistan’s dairy industry. While signs of progress exist, they are more of an exception than the rule.
Economic progress cannot be made until the government administers essential services such as electricity, efficient irrigation systems, and the general infrastructure that provides the base for economic improvement. Currently, the government can only provide a paltry 6% of its populous with electricity. International donors have given billions of dollars worth of aid money, and perhaps more is needed, but the main obstacle to development seems not to be lack of aid, but lack of honest government. Corrupt regional leaders who have been co-opted into the federal government need to be replaced with those who have an interest in Afghanistan as a whole and not merely their own self interest, a far cry from the entrenched tribalism of the nation, making house cleaning an extremely difficult task.
Some say security is a prerequisite for economic growth, but if creative solutions aren’t implemented for both security and economic problems, expect to see Afghanistan slip back into the internecine conflict that has plagued it for much of its history.
Tuesday, December 5, 2006
Interview with Ali Kurdistani (A Kurdish Journalist) by Angad Singh
I met Ali Kurdistani in Nicosia, Cyprus in the summer of 2006 while attending a symposium on Middle East conflicts. I approached Mr. Kurdistani for this interview because the Kurdish perspective has been largely overlooked in the common discourse about Iraq. However, Mr. Kurdistani’s views are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of International Intelligencer.
-Angad Singh
Q: Hello and thank you for participating in the interview. Can you give me your name, job, and what publications you have written for?
A: First of all, I want to thank International Intelligencer for giving me this opportunity to extend my view to the American people. My name is Ali Kurdistani, and I am a political writer and journalist in Iraqi Kurdistan. Since 2001 I have been writing articles and stories for many local Kurdish newspapers like Kurdistani Nwe, Aso, Hawal, Hawlati, and most recently, Soma Digest. Most of these are political newspapers, some belong to Kurdish political parties, and others are independent. Most of my articles are about political affairs especially political Islam, US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq, Kurdish–American relations, and Israeli foreign policy.
Q: Many people are unaware of what makes the Kurdish people unique. Can you describe how the Kurds are different from Arabs?
A: The Kurds are politically and culturally much closer to the West than Arabs. We are pro-Westerners but the Arabs are anti–Westerners. This is generally true because there are some open-minded Arabs, but very a few in Iraq. There is currently no violence against Americans and other foreigners in Kurdistan; no American soldier has been killed by the Kurds or in Kurdistan. Meanwhile in Arab areas of Iraq, there is daily terror against Americans and all Westerners. The Kurds are looking for a secular state in Iraq like the American and European secular and democratic models. Even though we are Muslims, there are few Islamists in Kurdistan. We are frankly rejecting the establishment of an Islamic government in Iraq and Kurdistan. We promote the Kurdish secular view to solve Iraqi problems while Arab Islamists promote a religious view. This is one of the main differences between the Kurds and Arabs in the current Iraq.
Q: Can you explain how Kurdistan operates within the greater Iraq? How Independent is it from the rest of the country? Is there a struggle to disarm the peshmerga, the Kurdish militia?
A: Kurdistan is like another country in Iraq right now. There is a different economic, political, and security situation in Kurdistan than other parts of Iraq. Kurdistan is not separated officially from Iraq yet, even though we have our own government, parliament, and Kurdistan President, Masoud Barzani. Kurdistan is well guarded by the Kurdish Army, the peshmarga, and Kurdish security guards. Economically, we are still getting money from the Iraqi government, which is our own share of Iraqi oil money that is divided among the Iraqi governates. Kurdistan is mostly independent politically, even in our relations with the US, EU, and other regional neighbors. Economically, we are going to have our own oilfields in Kurdistan. About the peshmarga, there is no struggle to disarm the peshmarga by the Iraqi government and America, because the peshmarga is not a militia group like others in Iraq. The peshmarga is now an official Kurdish Army to protect Kurdistan.
Q: What is the situation in Kirkuk? Is it rightfully Kurdish or are there some legitimate Arab claims to it? Why is it so important?
A: The situation in Kirkuk is not normalized yet. Kirkuk was originally a Kurdish city with Arab, Turkmen and Christian minorities. This city during Saddam’s regime became Arabized by forcing Kurdish families to leave their native home and replacing them by Arab families from the Middle and South of Iraq. This process happened especially in Kirkuk and Khanaqin. Later, those Kurdish families became refugees in other cities of Iraqi Kurdistan and stayed there, especially in Sulaimania, Erbil, and Dhok. After the liberation of Iraq, those families tried to get back home but they could not. There was even an article in the Iraqi transitional constitution in 2003, article 58, that tried to normalize the Kirkuk situation but the Iraqi government and coalition forces did not implement it. The Kirkuk situation is still not better especially because there is a security problem and therefore the Kurds are not satisfied with what’s going on in Kirkuk. Whether the Kurds will be able to return home depends on article 140 in the new Iraqi constitution. There should be a referendum in 2007 to determine whether Kirkuk will be part of Iraq or Kurdistan. In the Kurdish view, Kirkuk is so important not just because of oil, but also because it’s part of our country, Kurdistan.
Q: Describe the affects the US invasion of Iraq has had on the Kurdish people and Kurdistan. What is the general feeling of the Kurdish people towards this 2nd Gulf War?
A: The US invasion made a very good impression on the Kurdish people because the US overthrew our main enemy in Iraq, Saddam Hussein. His regime oppressed us for 35 years. The Kurdish people were very happy with the war; we felt that the US came to punish our enemy and liberate us. It was the first time in our life that the warplanes over Kurdistan’s sky fought against our enemy. We supported the invasion because it was against the most dictatorial regime in the world. We raised an American flag beside the Kurdish flag and put the American president’s photo beside Kurdish leaders’ photos and we celebrated for days with one of the biggest parties in our history.
Q: How did Saddam Hussein treat the Kurdish people? Can you describe the Anfal campaign, Arabization, and some other ways Hussein oppressed the Kurds?
A: Saddam’s regime treated the Kurdish people very badly. Saddam did not just oppress Kurdish fighters, but oppressed all the Kurdish people, all children and old people as well. The Anfal campaign is the biggest crime Saddam did against the Kurdish people. Anfal is a long story; I cannot describe it in just a few sentences. In general, Anfal was a process where the Iraqi Army attacked Kurdish villages and towns in Kurdistan, even with chemical weapons. They destroyed many villages and killed many people. Later, the Iraqi Army arrested those still alive and took them to the South of Iraq and separated parents from children. Later, after 3 to 5 months, they released the old people. The rest of the Kurdish families, about 182,000 people including women and children, were burned alive and thrown in a ditch. After the Iraq War, we found many mass-graves. Some of them were recognized as deaths from the Anfal campaign. Arabization was a long process by Saddam’s regime to destroy Kurdish identity and culture. Saddam tried to Arabize Kurdistan’s demographic by forcing Kurdish families to leave their homes and replacing them with Arab families, especially in Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Mosul. Also, the education system was another part of Arabization by teaching Arabic culture, history, and geography of the Arab homeland to Kurdish students.
Q: What is the prospect for a proper Kurdish state? What role do Iran, Turkey, Syria and other countries play in the goal for a completely independent Kurdistan?
A: In Iraqi Kurdistan, all of the Kurds want to have their own Kurdish state, but there is a lack of international and regional support and many other obstacles blocking this main Kurdish dream. Our leaders usually say we will stay with the united Iraq despite our right to a Kurdish independent state. Regional powers always take the role of suppressing any Kurdish attempts to establish a Kurdish state in the Middle East. They are still scared about what's going on in Iraqi Kurdistan after Iraq war. After the US came to our region, those regional powers are much less powerful against the Kurds. Like before, America and Israel, and Western powers have a bigger role in Kurdistan and in the goal of a Kurdish independent state. Therefore the Kurds, with their support, will determine Kurdistan’s fate. Finally, the Kurdish state will be born in the near future.
Q: What is the main issue of friction between Kurdish groups such as the PUK, KDP, and PKK? Do you think the violence of the PKK in Turkey is helpful in changing attitudes about Kurdish rights? How are Kurds treated in Turkey?
A: The Kurdish political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan have their own structure. They were born in the specific political, social, and economic situation in Iraqi Kurdistan. There is no friction between the PUK and KDP. Both have political and national approaches for the same goals and there is no ideological friction between them. When they fought each other in 2004-2006 it was due to political and economic power because both declared that they were the Kurdish party fighting for Kurdish rights and interests in Iraq. The PKK was born in Turkey and therefore has a different view of Kurdish problems. They call for a greater Kurdistan. PUK and KDP never call for greater Kurdistan. The PKK’s use of violence in Turkey will not solve Kurdish problems. I do believe that the Kurdish problem will be solved peacefully in Turkey. The Kurds are treated badly in Turkey. They still do not have cultural and national rights there. The EU has warned Turkey many times about violating Kurdish rights. It is another obstacle to Turkey’s membership to the EU.
Q: How has Kurdistan progressed and grown, economically and politically, since the 2003 US invasion?
A: Since the US invasion, Kurdistan has been progressing in many main aspects, especially politically and economically. On the local level, we have achieved many important political gains for Kurds in Iraq. Internationally, the Kurdish case has advanced. We have become allies of the US and England, and we have established new relations with many Western countries. Since the invasion, many countries, especially America and Europe, have focused on Kurdistan. They want to build political, diplomatic and economic relations with Iraqi Kurdistan. They will even have a diplomatic mission in Kurdistan. Our foundations and organizations have become members of international organizations, and recently the Kurdistan regional government officially agreed to take part in UN conventions and meetings. Economically our budget increased and many Western and regional companies are coming to Kurdistan to invest. We have started digging oilfields in Kurdistan. Also since the invasion, we have built two international airports, which have had a major influence on the economic and political situations because of direct flights between Kurdistan, Europe, and Middle Eastern countries.
Q: Do you think Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq, is doing a good job? What is the significance of having a Kurdish politician in the higher realms of the Iraqi government?
A: I do think Jalal Talabani is doing a good job in Baghdad. We still live within Iraq and should therefore be part of the Iraqi government. We need to be able to oppose those Arabs who will create problems for the Kurds and Kurdistan. For example, Talabani opposed Ibrahim Jafari, former Iraqi Prime Minister, when he made decisions unfavorable to Iraqi Kurds. We are not in Baghdad to serve the Arabs. We are there to support and achieve political and national rights for which we have fought over a large part of Iraq’s history. If there were no Kurdish politician in the higher levels of the Iraqi government, the Arabs would violate Kurdish rights and make more problems for the Kurds. Having Talabani, Kurdish ministers, and Kurdish members in the Iraqi parliament is important for Kurdistan. We are in Baghdad defending and protecting the achievements we have made in Iraqi Kurdistan and are participating in shaping and forming the new Iraqi government, which will never attack Kurdistan again.
Q: What are the future prospects of Iraq in general? How is the fighting in the center, Anbar province, and Baghdad to stop? Can Iraq unify or do separate countries need to be made along ethnic lines such as Kurdistan in the north, a Sunni country in the middle, and Shiites in the south?
A: I get information on the central and Southern Iraq via the media. Iraq is already separated into three provinces, but that is not recognized officially except for the Kurdistan region, which is recognized by Iraqi constitution as a federal region. There is the possibility of establishing a Kurdish state in the north of Iraq because we have the main elements of a state, like a good economic and security situation. And we have more than 15 years experience administrating Kurdistan. In the future, Iraq will separate into three states, but those states might be within a federal government in Baghdad.
-Angad Singh
Q: Hello and thank you for participating in the interview. Can you give me your name, job, and what publications you have written for?
A: First of all, I want to thank International Intelligencer for giving me this opportunity to extend my view to the American people. My name is Ali Kurdistani, and I am a political writer and journalist in Iraqi Kurdistan. Since 2001 I have been writing articles and stories for many local Kurdish newspapers like Kurdistani Nwe, Aso, Hawal, Hawlati, and most recently, Soma Digest. Most of these are political newspapers, some belong to Kurdish political parties, and others are independent. Most of my articles are about political affairs especially political Islam, US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq, Kurdish–American relations, and Israeli foreign policy.
Q: Many people are unaware of what makes the Kurdish people unique. Can you describe how the Kurds are different from Arabs?
A: The Kurds are politically and culturally much closer to the West than Arabs. We are pro-Westerners but the Arabs are anti–Westerners. This is generally true because there are some open-minded Arabs, but very a few in Iraq. There is currently no violence against Americans and other foreigners in Kurdistan; no American soldier has been killed by the Kurds or in Kurdistan. Meanwhile in Arab areas of Iraq, there is daily terror against Americans and all Westerners. The Kurds are looking for a secular state in Iraq like the American and European secular and democratic models. Even though we are Muslims, there are few Islamists in Kurdistan. We are frankly rejecting the establishment of an Islamic government in Iraq and Kurdistan. We promote the Kurdish secular view to solve Iraqi problems while Arab Islamists promote a religious view. This is one of the main differences between the Kurds and Arabs in the current Iraq.
Q: Can you explain how Kurdistan operates within the greater Iraq? How Independent is it from the rest of the country? Is there a struggle to disarm the peshmerga, the Kurdish militia?
A: Kurdistan is like another country in Iraq right now. There is a different economic, political, and security situation in Kurdistan than other parts of Iraq. Kurdistan is not separated officially from Iraq yet, even though we have our own government, parliament, and Kurdistan President, Masoud Barzani. Kurdistan is well guarded by the Kurdish Army, the peshmarga, and Kurdish security guards. Economically, we are still getting money from the Iraqi government, which is our own share of Iraqi oil money that is divided among the Iraqi governates. Kurdistan is mostly independent politically, even in our relations with the US, EU, and other regional neighbors. Economically, we are going to have our own oilfields in Kurdistan. About the peshmarga, there is no struggle to disarm the peshmarga by the Iraqi government and America, because the peshmarga is not a militia group like others in Iraq. The peshmarga is now an official Kurdish Army to protect Kurdistan.
Q: What is the situation in Kirkuk? Is it rightfully Kurdish or are there some legitimate Arab claims to it? Why is it so important?
A: The situation in Kirkuk is not normalized yet. Kirkuk was originally a Kurdish city with Arab, Turkmen and Christian minorities. This city during Saddam’s regime became Arabized by forcing Kurdish families to leave their native home and replacing them by Arab families from the Middle and South of Iraq. This process happened especially in Kirkuk and Khanaqin. Later, those Kurdish families became refugees in other cities of Iraqi Kurdistan and stayed there, especially in Sulaimania, Erbil, and Dhok. After the liberation of Iraq, those families tried to get back home but they could not. There was even an article in the Iraqi transitional constitution in 2003, article 58, that tried to normalize the Kirkuk situation but the Iraqi government and coalition forces did not implement it. The Kirkuk situation is still not better especially because there is a security problem and therefore the Kurds are not satisfied with what’s going on in Kirkuk. Whether the Kurds will be able to return home depends on article 140 in the new Iraqi constitution. There should be a referendum in 2007 to determine whether Kirkuk will be part of Iraq or Kurdistan. In the Kurdish view, Kirkuk is so important not just because of oil, but also because it’s part of our country, Kurdistan.
Q: Describe the affects the US invasion of Iraq has had on the Kurdish people and Kurdistan. What is the general feeling of the Kurdish people towards this 2nd Gulf War?
A: The US invasion made a very good impression on the Kurdish people because the US overthrew our main enemy in Iraq, Saddam Hussein. His regime oppressed us for 35 years. The Kurdish people were very happy with the war; we felt that the US came to punish our enemy and liberate us. It was the first time in our life that the warplanes over Kurdistan’s sky fought against our enemy. We supported the invasion because it was against the most dictatorial regime in the world. We raised an American flag beside the Kurdish flag and put the American president’s photo beside Kurdish leaders’ photos and we celebrated for days with one of the biggest parties in our history.
Q: How did Saddam Hussein treat the Kurdish people? Can you describe the Anfal campaign, Arabization, and some other ways Hussein oppressed the Kurds?
A: Saddam’s regime treated the Kurdish people very badly. Saddam did not just oppress Kurdish fighters, but oppressed all the Kurdish people, all children and old people as well. The Anfal campaign is the biggest crime Saddam did against the Kurdish people. Anfal is a long story; I cannot describe it in just a few sentences. In general, Anfal was a process where the Iraqi Army attacked Kurdish villages and towns in Kurdistan, even with chemical weapons. They destroyed many villages and killed many people. Later, the Iraqi Army arrested those still alive and took them to the South of Iraq and separated parents from children. Later, after 3 to 5 months, they released the old people. The rest of the Kurdish families, about 182,000 people including women and children, were burned alive and thrown in a ditch. After the Iraq War, we found many mass-graves. Some of them were recognized as deaths from the Anfal campaign. Arabization was a long process by Saddam’s regime to destroy Kurdish identity and culture. Saddam tried to Arabize Kurdistan’s demographic by forcing Kurdish families to leave their homes and replacing them with Arab families, especially in Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Mosul. Also, the education system was another part of Arabization by teaching Arabic culture, history, and geography of the Arab homeland to Kurdish students.
Q: What is the prospect for a proper Kurdish state? What role do Iran, Turkey, Syria and other countries play in the goal for a completely independent Kurdistan?
A: In Iraqi Kurdistan, all of the Kurds want to have their own Kurdish state, but there is a lack of international and regional support and many other obstacles blocking this main Kurdish dream. Our leaders usually say we will stay with the united Iraq despite our right to a Kurdish independent state. Regional powers always take the role of suppressing any Kurdish attempts to establish a Kurdish state in the Middle East. They are still scared about what's going on in Iraqi Kurdistan after Iraq war. After the US came to our region, those regional powers are much less powerful against the Kurds. Like before, America and Israel, and Western powers have a bigger role in Kurdistan and in the goal of a Kurdish independent state. Therefore the Kurds, with their support, will determine Kurdistan’s fate. Finally, the Kurdish state will be born in the near future.
Q: What is the main issue of friction between Kurdish groups such as the PUK, KDP, and PKK? Do you think the violence of the PKK in Turkey is helpful in changing attitudes about Kurdish rights? How are Kurds treated in Turkey?
A: The Kurdish political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan have their own structure. They were born in the specific political, social, and economic situation in Iraqi Kurdistan. There is no friction between the PUK and KDP. Both have political and national approaches for the same goals and there is no ideological friction between them. When they fought each other in 2004-2006 it was due to political and economic power because both declared that they were the Kurdish party fighting for Kurdish rights and interests in Iraq. The PKK was born in Turkey and therefore has a different view of Kurdish problems. They call for a greater Kurdistan. PUK and KDP never call for greater Kurdistan. The PKK’s use of violence in Turkey will not solve Kurdish problems. I do believe that the Kurdish problem will be solved peacefully in Turkey. The Kurds are treated badly in Turkey. They still do not have cultural and national rights there. The EU has warned Turkey many times about violating Kurdish rights. It is another obstacle to Turkey’s membership to the EU.
Q: How has Kurdistan progressed and grown, economically and politically, since the 2003 US invasion?
A: Since the US invasion, Kurdistan has been progressing in many main aspects, especially politically and economically. On the local level, we have achieved many important political gains for Kurds in Iraq. Internationally, the Kurdish case has advanced. We have become allies of the US and England, and we have established new relations with many Western countries. Since the invasion, many countries, especially America and Europe, have focused on Kurdistan. They want to build political, diplomatic and economic relations with Iraqi Kurdistan. They will even have a diplomatic mission in Kurdistan. Our foundations and organizations have become members of international organizations, and recently the Kurdistan regional government officially agreed to take part in UN conventions and meetings. Economically our budget increased and many Western and regional companies are coming to Kurdistan to invest. We have started digging oilfields in Kurdistan. Also since the invasion, we have built two international airports, which have had a major influence on the economic and political situations because of direct flights between Kurdistan, Europe, and Middle Eastern countries.
Q: Do you think Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq, is doing a good job? What is the significance of having a Kurdish politician in the higher realms of the Iraqi government?
A: I do think Jalal Talabani is doing a good job in Baghdad. We still live within Iraq and should therefore be part of the Iraqi government. We need to be able to oppose those Arabs who will create problems for the Kurds and Kurdistan. For example, Talabani opposed Ibrahim Jafari, former Iraqi Prime Minister, when he made decisions unfavorable to Iraqi Kurds. We are not in Baghdad to serve the Arabs. We are there to support and achieve political and national rights for which we have fought over a large part of Iraq’s history. If there were no Kurdish politician in the higher levels of the Iraqi government, the Arabs would violate Kurdish rights and make more problems for the Kurds. Having Talabani, Kurdish ministers, and Kurdish members in the Iraqi parliament is important for Kurdistan. We are in Baghdad defending and protecting the achievements we have made in Iraqi Kurdistan and are participating in shaping and forming the new Iraqi government, which will never attack Kurdistan again.
Q: What are the future prospects of Iraq in general? How is the fighting in the center, Anbar province, and Baghdad to stop? Can Iraq unify or do separate countries need to be made along ethnic lines such as Kurdistan in the north, a Sunni country in the middle, and Shiites in the south?
A: I get information on the central and Southern Iraq via the media. Iraq is already separated into three provinces, but that is not recognized officially except for the Kurdistan region, which is recognized by Iraqi constitution as a federal region. There is the possibility of establishing a Kurdish state in the north of Iraq because we have the main elements of a state, like a good economic and security situation. And we have more than 15 years experience administrating Kurdistan. In the future, Iraq will separate into three states, but those states might be within a federal government in Baghdad.
Checks and Balances: Thai Style by Andrew Brooks
Thaksin Shinawatra, Thailand’s democratically elected Prime Minister, has become an increasingly controversial figure in Thai politics since his ouster in a recent military coup-d’etat. Before September 19th, 2006, Thailand had enjoyed 15 years of relative political calm after the coup of 1991, whose conclusion replaced an unwelcome military dictatorship with a democratically elected civilian government. Thaksin became Prime Minister in February, 2001. Over the course of the next 5 years, alleged corruption in the central government, social division, and growing ethnic and religious tensions in the diverse Southern provinces have become known as the most immediate threats to Thai stability. In spite of his role in the recent military take-over, coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin has promised to repair the failures in government that Thaksin has come to symbolize.
The former Prime Minister’s five years in office draws regional partisanship. While those in major cities have branded him no more than a corrupt businessman, using his post to enrich himself, his family, and his business partners, rural workers regard their former leader as a moral man working tirelessly for the Thai people. However many saw Thaksin’s popularity and disdain for the monarchy as a violation of a long-standing political tradition. Responding to intelligence that Thaksin had planned his own military power grab in Bangkok the same day of the coup, reports indicate that King Bhumibol ordered a military solution from loyalist generals that became the September overthrow.
The former Prime Minister’s political record is as mixed as his reputation, but offers a web of paradoxes that stray from the partisanship and rhetoric in public debate. While many see Thaksin’s economic policy as simultaneously pro-Western and self-interested, his health and micro-finance reforms have buoyed small rural businesses and the national economy, and have allowed access to medical care and insurance to millions of Thais who were previously without them.
However, Thai news sources have revealed that Thaksin’s reforms may not have been as benevolent or representative of the people’s will as they seemed. While rural and poor Thais have been able to receive medical treatment or any operation for less than a single US dollar under Thaksin’s universal healthcare program, that policy has bankrupted the public hospital system, thereby driving wealthier Thais to expensive private hospitals, many of which are owned by family members of the former Prime Minister. Despite popular support for tax breaks and incentives and micro-finance opportunities central to his economic policy, Thaksin was able to use loopholes hidden in broad economic reform packages to sell his family’s $1.9 billion stake in a major telecommunications firm tax-free. Whether or not allegations of corruption are true, these social-welfare programs allowed him to justify a pattern of alleged predation that crippled his legitimacy as prime minister.
Thaksin’s domestic security policy has also come under fire in recent years. His aggressive use of only military means to suppress Islamic insurgency groups in the Southern provinces had not made any progress. On the contrary, it has radicalized their religious underpinnings. The Mujahadeen Islam Pattani and the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) are among militant Islamic groups fighting in a hundred-year-old struggle for separation from the Thai state. Weekly shootings, bombings, and kidnappings began to intensify in late 2003 and early 2004 and claimed the lives of over 1000 Southern Thais, to date, mostly Buddhists. Coupled with his anti-narcotics campaigns in Bangkok in 2003, in which the Thai military police shot and killed hundreds of innocent Thais, took bribes, and planted evidence, Thaksin’s hard-line “shoot first, ask questions later,” approach to security drew broad criticism, characterized as brutal and unconstructive.
While King Bhumibol has not been faced with such high-stakes policy decisions, he has built an enormous base of political support albeit outside the democratic system. Thailand’s ninth king in its current dynasty has cultivated an image comparable to that of a new Siddhartha; he is renowned for his benevolent influence on government and society. Though he has very little formal power and often speaks in proverbs, his words mobilize the populace like no politician can. The mere mention of traffic in Bangkok or passing question of a politician’s integrity will stir thousands within the government and public to action. He has used the royal purse, funded by donations from supporters, to embark on agricultural projects for poor peasants, social programs, and even flood-relief. Having eschewed formal politics, his enormous power has come almost entirely from his philanthropy.
In essence, the Thai military has removed one populist and replaced him with another. Due to the King’s military and popular support, the coup strongly favors the monarchy. It allows Bhumibol, who has close ties to coup leader General Sonthi and Acting Prime Minister Surayud Chulalont, to play a role in determining what form the new Thai democracy will take. Whether or not these three leaders are transparent in the process of addressing national concerns, rewriting the constitution, and rebuilding the government, will hold great bearing on the quality of democracy that results. Because he relies on a reputation of benevolence, Bhumibol has constrained himself and military leaders to achieving nothing less than success. They must restore a better, less corrupt, more representative, and more constructive democracy. If they do not, the power of the monarchy, the coup leaders, and the overall quality of democracy, will have taken a serious blow.
The former Prime Minister’s five years in office draws regional partisanship. While those in major cities have branded him no more than a corrupt businessman, using his post to enrich himself, his family, and his business partners, rural workers regard their former leader as a moral man working tirelessly for the Thai people. However many saw Thaksin’s popularity and disdain for the monarchy as a violation of a long-standing political tradition. Responding to intelligence that Thaksin had planned his own military power grab in Bangkok the same day of the coup, reports indicate that King Bhumibol ordered a military solution from loyalist generals that became the September overthrow.
The former Prime Minister’s political record is as mixed as his reputation, but offers a web of paradoxes that stray from the partisanship and rhetoric in public debate. While many see Thaksin’s economic policy as simultaneously pro-Western and self-interested, his health and micro-finance reforms have buoyed small rural businesses and the national economy, and have allowed access to medical care and insurance to millions of Thais who were previously without them.
However, Thai news sources have revealed that Thaksin’s reforms may not have been as benevolent or representative of the people’s will as they seemed. While rural and poor Thais have been able to receive medical treatment or any operation for less than a single US dollar under Thaksin’s universal healthcare program, that policy has bankrupted the public hospital system, thereby driving wealthier Thais to expensive private hospitals, many of which are owned by family members of the former Prime Minister. Despite popular support for tax breaks and incentives and micro-finance opportunities central to his economic policy, Thaksin was able to use loopholes hidden in broad economic reform packages to sell his family’s $1.9 billion stake in a major telecommunications firm tax-free. Whether or not allegations of corruption are true, these social-welfare programs allowed him to justify a pattern of alleged predation that crippled his legitimacy as prime minister.
Thaksin’s domestic security policy has also come under fire in recent years. His aggressive use of only military means to suppress Islamic insurgency groups in the Southern provinces had not made any progress. On the contrary, it has radicalized their religious underpinnings. The Mujahadeen Islam Pattani and the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) are among militant Islamic groups fighting in a hundred-year-old struggle for separation from the Thai state. Weekly shootings, bombings, and kidnappings began to intensify in late 2003 and early 2004 and claimed the lives of over 1000 Southern Thais, to date, mostly Buddhists. Coupled with his anti-narcotics campaigns in Bangkok in 2003, in which the Thai military police shot and killed hundreds of innocent Thais, took bribes, and planted evidence, Thaksin’s hard-line “shoot first, ask questions later,” approach to security drew broad criticism, characterized as brutal and unconstructive.
While King Bhumibol has not been faced with such high-stakes policy decisions, he has built an enormous base of political support albeit outside the democratic system. Thailand’s ninth king in its current dynasty has cultivated an image comparable to that of a new Siddhartha; he is renowned for his benevolent influence on government and society. Though he has very little formal power and often speaks in proverbs, his words mobilize the populace like no politician can. The mere mention of traffic in Bangkok or passing question of a politician’s integrity will stir thousands within the government and public to action. He has used the royal purse, funded by donations from supporters, to embark on agricultural projects for poor peasants, social programs, and even flood-relief. Having eschewed formal politics, his enormous power has come almost entirely from his philanthropy.
In essence, the Thai military has removed one populist and replaced him with another. Due to the King’s military and popular support, the coup strongly favors the monarchy. It allows Bhumibol, who has close ties to coup leader General Sonthi and Acting Prime Minister Surayud Chulalont, to play a role in determining what form the new Thai democracy will take. Whether or not these three leaders are transparent in the process of addressing national concerns, rewriting the constitution, and rebuilding the government, will hold great bearing on the quality of democracy that results. Because he relies on a reputation of benevolence, Bhumibol has constrained himself and military leaders to achieving nothing less than success. They must restore a better, less corrupt, more representative, and more constructive democracy. If they do not, the power of the monarchy, the coup leaders, and the overall quality of democracy, will have taken a serious blow.
Live from West Point: A Paradigm Shift by Joshua Keating
Last month, as I flew across the Eastern seaboard from the warm and crunchy confines of Oberlin to a strange new world of the Student Conference on U.S. Affairs at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the country’s political establishment was undergoing its own radical transition. As I was landing, I saw on the news that Donald Rumsfeld was stepping down as Secretary of Defense. Then the even bigger shock: Senator George Allen, after offending one macaca too many, was conceding to challenger Jim Webb, giving democrats control of the Senate. If ever there was a weekend to reexamine America’s global policy this was it.
With the appointment of Robert Gates to the Secretary of Defense post, James Baker and Henry Kissinger weighing in on the Iraq debacle, and increased calls to negotiate with Iran and Syria, it appears that realism is back in vogue in America’s foreign policy establishment. This was more than reflected in the conference.
SCUSA is an undergraduate foreign policy conference which has been held at West Point for the past 58 years. Hundreds of delegates from American colleges and military academies attend to discuss various aspects of US foreign policy. Oberlin sends one delegate every year thanks to generous funding by the Richard Hallock foundation.
At my table, which discussed US policy toward Russia and Central Asia (no Borat jokes please!) debate was lively and informed on topics ranging from nuclear non-proliferation to oil and gas reserves. But the mood became more despondent and confused when the topic of democracy building came up. One student delegate went so far as to say that democracy wasn’t even something we should be talking about.
The attitude was similar from the keynote speakers who addressed us. One professor said he believed that the Bush administration’s promotion of democracy in the Middle East had created a situation where we had no choice but to negotiate with regimes whose interests and beliefs are diametrically opposed to ours. A former prominent member of Bush’s foreign policy team admitted that since 9/11, America has a huge image problem and we should reorient our policies towards informing the world about all the great things we do rather than trying to impose our values. (I would name names but we were specifically told that the speeches were not for attribution and I never mess with a school were students are required to keep big-ass rifles in their dorm rooms).
Can it really be only 15 years since we were so sure that democracy and capitalism would triumph that some went so far as to proclaim “the end of history?” Ten years since Bill Clinton assured us that “commerce helps make the world safe for democracy?” One year since George W. Bush earned a round of applause from both sides of the aisle for proclaiming that “the advance of freedom will lead to peace,” and “We are witnessing landmark events in the history of liberty. And in the coming years, we will add to that story?”
Has the Bush team’s foreign policy, that deformed bastard child of Ronald Reagan and Leon Trotsky, made us so cynical about America’s role in the world that we’re going to give up on spreading democracy and human rights altogether, close off our borders to immigration and trade and focus solely on security?
The signs from the party now in control of congress are not promising. It was the Democrats, remember, who led the fight against the completely reasonable Dubai ports deal, a move widely viewed as racist and reactionary in the Muslim world. Democratic lawmakers have already signaled opposition to trade deals with Colombia, Peru and Haiti. And despite bipartisan support and favorable public opinion, the new Congress does not seem to have any plans in the works to do anything productive to make America’s immigration process more humane and sensible.
That voters have finally come around and recognized the true folly of Bush’s crusader foreign policy is a positive development. I was happy to see that both civilian and military delegates seemed to agree that military force was generally not the best way to accomplish the ideological objectives of U.S. foreign policy. Talking to our enemies and being humble in our goals would certainly be a welcome change, but I worry that disaffection with Bush’s Wilsonian idealism will lead to Jacksonian isolationism, to borrow Walter Russell Mead’s terms.
With the best of intentions, America’s foreign policy since 9/11 has created far more problems than it has solved. I hope that the new “realist” leadership in Washington, and the future leadership represented by students like those at SCUSA and at Oberlin, will recognize that in order to solve America’s problems, the nation must become more engaged in the world, not less.
With the appointment of Robert Gates to the Secretary of Defense post, James Baker and Henry Kissinger weighing in on the Iraq debacle, and increased calls to negotiate with Iran and Syria, it appears that realism is back in vogue in America’s foreign policy establishment. This was more than reflected in the conference.
SCUSA is an undergraduate foreign policy conference which has been held at West Point for the past 58 years. Hundreds of delegates from American colleges and military academies attend to discuss various aspects of US foreign policy. Oberlin sends one delegate every year thanks to generous funding by the Richard Hallock foundation.
At my table, which discussed US policy toward Russia and Central Asia (no Borat jokes please!) debate was lively and informed on topics ranging from nuclear non-proliferation to oil and gas reserves. But the mood became more despondent and confused when the topic of democracy building came up. One student delegate went so far as to say that democracy wasn’t even something we should be talking about.
The attitude was similar from the keynote speakers who addressed us. One professor said he believed that the Bush administration’s promotion of democracy in the Middle East had created a situation where we had no choice but to negotiate with regimes whose interests and beliefs are diametrically opposed to ours. A former prominent member of Bush’s foreign policy team admitted that since 9/11, America has a huge image problem and we should reorient our policies towards informing the world about all the great things we do rather than trying to impose our values. (I would name names but we were specifically told that the speeches were not for attribution and I never mess with a school were students are required to keep big-ass rifles in their dorm rooms).
Can it really be only 15 years since we were so sure that democracy and capitalism would triumph that some went so far as to proclaim “the end of history?” Ten years since Bill Clinton assured us that “commerce helps make the world safe for democracy?” One year since George W. Bush earned a round of applause from both sides of the aisle for proclaiming that “the advance of freedom will lead to peace,” and “We are witnessing landmark events in the history of liberty. And in the coming years, we will add to that story?”
Has the Bush team’s foreign policy, that deformed bastard child of Ronald Reagan and Leon Trotsky, made us so cynical about America’s role in the world that we’re going to give up on spreading democracy and human rights altogether, close off our borders to immigration and trade and focus solely on security?
The signs from the party now in control of congress are not promising. It was the Democrats, remember, who led the fight against the completely reasonable Dubai ports deal, a move widely viewed as racist and reactionary in the Muslim world. Democratic lawmakers have already signaled opposition to trade deals with Colombia, Peru and Haiti. And despite bipartisan support and favorable public opinion, the new Congress does not seem to have any plans in the works to do anything productive to make America’s immigration process more humane and sensible.
That voters have finally come around and recognized the true folly of Bush’s crusader foreign policy is a positive development. I was happy to see that both civilian and military delegates seemed to agree that military force was generally not the best way to accomplish the ideological objectives of U.S. foreign policy. Talking to our enemies and being humble in our goals would certainly be a welcome change, but I worry that disaffection with Bush’s Wilsonian idealism will lead to Jacksonian isolationism, to borrow Walter Russell Mead’s terms.
With the best of intentions, America’s foreign policy since 9/11 has created far more problems than it has solved. I hope that the new “realist” leadership in Washington, and the future leadership represented by students like those at SCUSA and at Oberlin, will recognize that in order to solve America’s problems, the nation must become more engaged in the world, not less.
Don't Mess With Russia by Kevin Brondum
Russia and the United States are not friends. Events since the collapse of the USSR have disappointed the US’s initial euphoric hopes of easy cooperation with its former nuclear rival, and a bright, democratic future for the newly liberalized country. The end result of 74 years of Soviet communism and 15 years of post-Soviet liberal capitalism is a large country frustrated by the loss of its superpower status, struggling to maintain its traditional sphere of influence, disillusioned with its new capitalist democratic system, and engaged in an endless, exhausting effort to defeat the separatist movement in Chechnya.
It can only help so much to assign blame for Russia’s ongoing difficulties to liberal democracy. The West had no role in the escalation of the Chechen conflict, or President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to curtail and gradually undo democratic reforms, but its promotion of the “shock therapy” program, which sought to privatize Russia’s state-run economy as quickly as possible, was disastrous. It put property formerly held by the government up for grabs, and the ensuing economic free-for-all led to monstrously widespread mafia activity and helped boost a robber-baron oligarchy to power. Shock therapy brought about the collapse of the ruble in 1998, from which Russia has barely recovered.
Since then, the United States has managed to gall Russia in some other ways, not least by chipping away at Russia’s regional influence. Everyone following post-Soviet politics from the West has read or heard over-simplified, exultant reports of “color revolutions,” or “flower revolutions” in the media. The most recent examples are the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (2003), the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (2004), and the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan (2005). The typical account features a frustrated nation rising to demand that its corrupt, fraudulent, or dictatorial government be replaced with an accountable, honestly elected, democratic one.
The Western press is correct to characterize these movements as useful for the progress of Post-Soviet democracy, but deemphasizes the fact that these little “revolutions” would probably not have taken place without Western encouragement. American businessman and activist George Soros’s crucial financial and moral support for the Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution is well known and widely resented in Russia.
Former participants in the Rose Revolution later joined Westerners in supporting Ukraine’s Orange Revolution a year later in 2004, a popular protest against allegedly fraudulent results in the Ukrainian election. The initial results showed a narrow victory for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s favored candidate, Viktor Janukovich, which seemed to ensure Russia’s continued and unchallenged influence in Ukraine’s affairs. His opponent, Viktor Juschenko, had been the pro-Western candidate, and the favorite of Ukraine’s rising bourgeoisie. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which sent people to observe how the votes were tallied, reported fraud and voter intimidation intended to favor Janukovich, and Juschenko’s supporters took to the streets waving orange flags and wearing orange clothes to protest. The Orange Revolution, as it was called in the Western Press, successfully reversed the results of the election and granted the pro-Western Juschenko the presidential office.
Certainly, these color revolutions were a victory for democracy in principle. But Russians may be right to suspect ulterior motives in Western support for the “Rose” and “Orange Revolutions” — the politicians that came out the better for those events were, after all, pro-Western.
Whatever its motives, the frequency of Western interference in the affairs of post-Soviet states has won little good will toward our country from Russia. Russians’ feelings about the United States now approach paranoia. Aleksandr Prokhanov, a Russian writer, speculated quite ludicrously that the United States had incited France’s 2004 race riots to bully an ally that had opposed the Iraq invasion, and many Russians accepted the suggestion as entirely plausible. If Russians were capable of imagining that the United States engineered the Paris riots, they might easily imagine ulterior motives for American support of democratic movements in former Soviet Republics that have undermined Russia’s regional influence.
It should also come as no surprise, then, that Russia is beginning to assert itself in the geopolitical arena. At the G-8 summit, Russia refused to kowtow to the United States’ wishes in its policy toward Iran, a longstanding trade partner, and supported Iran’s claim to the right to enrich uranium in direct defiance of Washington’s wishes. Another illustrative example of Russia’s perceptible suspicion of the West was Air Force Commander Alexander Mikhailov’s open declaration in 2003 that Russia would shoot down any NATO spy plane caught flying even a kilometer inside Russian airspace.
The United States and its allies should feel fortunate that Russians’ popular distrust and resentment of the West has not escalated to outright hostility. We have to avoid antagonizing the only country whose nuclear arsenal matches the United States’ for sheer size. Of course the dynamics of deterrence virtually ensure that Russia would not stage a nuclear attack against us, but its stockpile gives it the muscle to assert itself. The Russian government has consistently shown its willingness to challenge perceived intrusions into its sphere of influence. In response to the success of the color revolutions, for instance, Putin accused Russian NGO’s of being “puppet” organizations, serving Western interests, and undermining Russian sovereignty. He signed a law permitting increased monitoring of their activities and funding, and gave the state the right to suspend any organization that got in the way of its governing effectively. The West’s unthinking intervention may, in fact, encourage the Russian state to tighten its control rather than progress toward a democratic ideal.
The Russian state guards its authority and power jealously from other contenders, such as big business, and still exercises much more power over the governed than has become traditional in the long-standing liberal democracies of the West. This is not the place to try identifying any deep cultural and historical causes for the ongoing difficulties of implementing democracy in Russia. I feel I can safely say, however, that democratization in Russia will be slow for a while to come. The West is not in a position to make Russia, nor any former Soviet Republic, democratic and free. After their defeat in the Cold War (and the West has treated it as a defeat), and the failure of “shock therapy”, why should the post-Soviet states continue to seek guidance from the West? Why shouldn’t they doubt Western competence, or the purity of Western intentions, in trying to “democratize” their state systems? If the former Soviet states are to democratize, they have to do it on their own.
It can only help so much to assign blame for Russia’s ongoing difficulties to liberal democracy. The West had no role in the escalation of the Chechen conflict, or President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to curtail and gradually undo democratic reforms, but its promotion of the “shock therapy” program, which sought to privatize Russia’s state-run economy as quickly as possible, was disastrous. It put property formerly held by the government up for grabs, and the ensuing economic free-for-all led to monstrously widespread mafia activity and helped boost a robber-baron oligarchy to power. Shock therapy brought about the collapse of the ruble in 1998, from which Russia has barely recovered.
Since then, the United States has managed to gall Russia in some other ways, not least by chipping away at Russia’s regional influence. Everyone following post-Soviet politics from the West has read or heard over-simplified, exultant reports of “color revolutions,” or “flower revolutions” in the media. The most recent examples are the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (2003), the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (2004), and the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan (2005). The typical account features a frustrated nation rising to demand that its corrupt, fraudulent, or dictatorial government be replaced with an accountable, honestly elected, democratic one.
The Western press is correct to characterize these movements as useful for the progress of Post-Soviet democracy, but deemphasizes the fact that these little “revolutions” would probably not have taken place without Western encouragement. American businessman and activist George Soros’s crucial financial and moral support for the Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution is well known and widely resented in Russia.
Former participants in the Rose Revolution later joined Westerners in supporting Ukraine’s Orange Revolution a year later in 2004, a popular protest against allegedly fraudulent results in the Ukrainian election. The initial results showed a narrow victory for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s favored candidate, Viktor Janukovich, which seemed to ensure Russia’s continued and unchallenged influence in Ukraine’s affairs. His opponent, Viktor Juschenko, had been the pro-Western candidate, and the favorite of Ukraine’s rising bourgeoisie. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which sent people to observe how the votes were tallied, reported fraud and voter intimidation intended to favor Janukovich, and Juschenko’s supporters took to the streets waving orange flags and wearing orange clothes to protest. The Orange Revolution, as it was called in the Western Press, successfully reversed the results of the election and granted the pro-Western Juschenko the presidential office.
Certainly, these color revolutions were a victory for democracy in principle. But Russians may be right to suspect ulterior motives in Western support for the “Rose” and “Orange Revolutions” — the politicians that came out the better for those events were, after all, pro-Western.
Whatever its motives, the frequency of Western interference in the affairs of post-Soviet states has won little good will toward our country from Russia. Russians’ feelings about the United States now approach paranoia. Aleksandr Prokhanov, a Russian writer, speculated quite ludicrously that the United States had incited France’s 2004 race riots to bully an ally that had opposed the Iraq invasion, and many Russians accepted the suggestion as entirely plausible. If Russians were capable of imagining that the United States engineered the Paris riots, they might easily imagine ulterior motives for American support of democratic movements in former Soviet Republics that have undermined Russia’s regional influence.
It should also come as no surprise, then, that Russia is beginning to assert itself in the geopolitical arena. At the G-8 summit, Russia refused to kowtow to the United States’ wishes in its policy toward Iran, a longstanding trade partner, and supported Iran’s claim to the right to enrich uranium in direct defiance of Washington’s wishes. Another illustrative example of Russia’s perceptible suspicion of the West was Air Force Commander Alexander Mikhailov’s open declaration in 2003 that Russia would shoot down any NATO spy plane caught flying even a kilometer inside Russian airspace.
The United States and its allies should feel fortunate that Russians’ popular distrust and resentment of the West has not escalated to outright hostility. We have to avoid antagonizing the only country whose nuclear arsenal matches the United States’ for sheer size. Of course the dynamics of deterrence virtually ensure that Russia would not stage a nuclear attack against us, but its stockpile gives it the muscle to assert itself. The Russian government has consistently shown its willingness to challenge perceived intrusions into its sphere of influence. In response to the success of the color revolutions, for instance, Putin accused Russian NGO’s of being “puppet” organizations, serving Western interests, and undermining Russian sovereignty. He signed a law permitting increased monitoring of their activities and funding, and gave the state the right to suspend any organization that got in the way of its governing effectively. The West’s unthinking intervention may, in fact, encourage the Russian state to tighten its control rather than progress toward a democratic ideal.
The Russian state guards its authority and power jealously from other contenders, such as big business, and still exercises much more power over the governed than has become traditional in the long-standing liberal democracies of the West. This is not the place to try identifying any deep cultural and historical causes for the ongoing difficulties of implementing democracy in Russia. I feel I can safely say, however, that democratization in Russia will be slow for a while to come. The West is not in a position to make Russia, nor any former Soviet Republic, democratic and free. After their defeat in the Cold War (and the West has treated it as a defeat), and the failure of “shock therapy”, why should the post-Soviet states continue to seek guidance from the West? Why shouldn’t they doubt Western competence, or the purity of Western intentions, in trying to “democratize” their state systems? If the former Soviet states are to democratize, they have to do it on their own.
Where Iraq Stands by Claudio Guler
Unfortunately, a political stability spectrum figure that is included in the print version of the article failed to transfer into this blog. I trust the article to still be understandable.
-Angad Singh
It has become abundantly clear that US policy and objectives in Iraq following the military invasion in March of 2003 have failed. The aggregate result has been a shift to the left by Iraqi society along its political-stability spectrum (figure above). The American ideological dream of compelling Iraq to shift rightward now appears incompatible and has led to a virtual government on the right of the spectrum, when Iraqi society actually finds itself on the left. In response to such a lack of substantiated government, Iraqis are retreating to the security of their tribal networks. This transition has invigorated the sectarian violence formerly existent in both the religious and the tribal realms.
This article, the first of a two part series, aims at presenting a framework of the current Iraqi situation on a political-stability spectrum. Also, I will draw several conclusions for the prospects of a national Iraqi government controlling a unified Iraq. The second article will then use this framework and these conclusions to discuss possible approaches to shifting Iraqi society rightward on the political-stability spectrum to regain stability. The second article will also discuss the partitioning and federalization of Iraq as an alternative to the single state model.
A fundamental prerequisite for an effective democracy is that the parties involved must be willing to compromise and seek consensus. If, however, the parties cannot compromise, as can be observed in Iraq, the government becomes virtual and incapable of providing services to its citizenry. Upholding law and order being the most elementary of these. This is the current state of Iraqi politics. The strong sectarian resentments between the Sunnis and the Shiites are rooted in an approximately 1,350-year-old feud over the true disciple of the prophet Muhammad. In addition, there exists the tribal animosity between the Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds and their splinter sects. All this hostility now finds itself unchecked and manifests itself daily on the streets of Iraq. In the political arena, the system has become gridlocked. Such unwillingness to compromise due to embedded conflict has thrown Iraqi politics into a state of polarized pluralism. This political phenomenon can be described as a situation in which there are too many parties with opposing views striving to control the government. As a result, no party is willing to compromise because of the fear of losing power and influence. Each party plays to its own constituents and is consequently applauded for upholding extremist policies and refusing compromise. Such polarized pluralism is further exacerbated by the demographic makeup of Iraq.
The three major sects, the Sunnis (~30%), the Shiites (~60%) and the Kurds (~10%) are disproportionately represented in Iraq. Any hope of putting together a popular majority government is therefore dismal because the Shiites would automatically win a majority and gain control of Iraq. Undoubtedly, this would be unacceptable for Sunnis and Kurds. In summation, the sectarian feud and the tribal strife in Iraq as well as their uncompromising conditions have lead to polarized pluralism in the political system and violence in the streets. Iraq will not soon be able to successfully implement a democratic government.
Iraq’s modern history has no democratic heritage. Following WWI, the British gained control of the territory of Iraq from the Ottoman Turks and instated King Faisal as its occupational ruler. In 1932 Iraq gained its independence from the British and in the same year its leader, King Faisal died. His successor, King Ghazi ruled until 1939, but his rule was often troubled by attempted military coups. Next came the government of Rashid Ali, but that too lasted only until 1941 when the British once again invaded Iraq over issues of oil. Iraq was again granted its independence in 1947 with the British instating the Hashemite Monarchy. By 1958 the Hashemite Monarchy had come to its end and thereafter, several successive military coups led by the Iraqi Army resulted in a series of short-term dictatorial governments. Finally, in 1968 Saddam Hussein al-Majid al-Tikriti ascended to power. This too happened by way of a military coup. Historically speaking, democracy in Iraq has never blossomed, so for what reason should it prosper spontaneously in three short and conflicted years?
This brings me to a discussion of US policy in Iraq. The Bush Administration’s original plan was to instantaneously shift Iraq further rightward on the political-stability spectrum. While still maintaining stability, the Americans thought that they could compel Iraqis to compromise and create a functioning democratic state. However, this line of reasoning was naïve because of the foreseeable Iraqi reluctance to compromise. The problem was further aggravated by the US’s decision to oust all Baath party officials from the former Iraqi government and military under Saddam Hussein following the country’s occupation. As a result, Iraq found itself without any functioning government. But instead of patiently waiting for a new one to be erected, Iraqis retreated to the safety of their tribal networks and began functioning extra-governmentally. This has resulted in the abrupt slip of Iraqi society to the left on the political-stability spectrum. So if stability must be regained and the shift cannot be completed collectively and democratically, what options remain?
What must be avoided is a further slip to the left by Iraqi society on the political-stability spectrum. Currently, the only factor holding Iraqi society in a state of semi-civil war is the American military presence. If the US exits under the current conditions, Iraq will be left in a power vacuum. This would likely result in full-scale civil war and possible military interventions by neighboring counties such as Iran and Syria looking to influence the outcome of a post-war Iraq. Furthermore, large-scale refugee dispersions into neighboring countries would place these nations under immense stress and worsen the already catastrophic humanitarian crisis. International oil supplies would be further negatively affected, generating a possible international economic recession. In other words, this scenario is extremely frightening. If all else fails, the US military must contain the conflict within Iraq’s borders. Moreover, it is important to note here, that if Iraq were to implode into full-scale civil war, the discussion contained in this article will most probably be irrelevant due to the unpredictable outcomes of such a scenario.
So the option that remains is the regrettable reality of an autocratic government. So far, it has been the only form of government that has persevered throughout the course of Iraqi history. This is due to the fact that autocratic governments supplied with sufficient resources have been able to quell the sectarian divisions within the country through the use of violence. To maintain stability over a given territory, autocrats are presented with two options. The first is to make political concessions; the second is to apply terror. Given the dismal success rate of democratic Iraqi compromise, terror is historically the preferred means. That is why an autocratic government finds itself in the middle of Iraq’s political-stability spectrum. Although not approaching the moral desirability of the democratic right of the spectrum, the autocratic government has provided a relative degree of stability for Iraq in the modern age.
Such stability does however come at a significant humanitarian cost. Two examples that immediately come to mind are the 1982 Hama Massacre in Syria and Saddam Hussein’s chemical attack on the Kurdish city of Halabja in 1988. The Hama Massacre transpired as follows. A domestic uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood of Hama, Syria was not well received by President Assad. In response, he ordered that Hama be besieged, pummeled with artillery, and subsequently infiltrated. The death toll of the massacre was estimated at 20,000 persons. Surely not all were involved in the uprising. But who they were did not matter as much as the message the massacre sent to the remainder of Syrians. Similarly, Saddam Hussein’s chemical attack on the Kurds, which killed an estimated 10,000 persons, was an attempt to reestablish his political dominance by force. Much like in Syria, in Iraq stability and violence are not mutually exclusive.
In conclusion, the establishment of a functional state in Iraq will result in a positive shift to the right by Iraqi society on its political-stability spectrum. This is what must be accomplished to end the senseless bloodshed. Unfortunately, to achieve stability and maintain Iraq as a single entity, more atrocities are to be expected. An in depth discussion of the options available to achieve this rightward shift will be presented in the next article.
The final conclusions for the analysis of Iraq’s political-stability spectrum are the following. First, democracy in Iraq will not work for now due to polarized pluralism. Iraqi society’s inability to compromise has gridlocked the virtual, US imposed, “democratic” state and caused Iraqi society to slip into a state of instability and semi-civil war. Second, Iraqi society must not slide further leftward along its political-stability spectrum. The civil war must be contained within the borders of Iraq as much as possible. Third, an autocratic government is the only form of government that has been able to control Iraq and offer a relative degree of stability, albeit at the regrettable humanitarian cost of such a regime. This is the context within which a constructive rightward shift for Iraq will be discussed in the following article.
-Angad Singh
It has become abundantly clear that US policy and objectives in Iraq following the military invasion in March of 2003 have failed. The aggregate result has been a shift to the left by Iraqi society along its political-stability spectrum (figure above). The American ideological dream of compelling Iraq to shift rightward now appears incompatible and has led to a virtual government on the right of the spectrum, when Iraqi society actually finds itself on the left. In response to such a lack of substantiated government, Iraqis are retreating to the security of their tribal networks. This transition has invigorated the sectarian violence formerly existent in both the religious and the tribal realms.
This article, the first of a two part series, aims at presenting a framework of the current Iraqi situation on a political-stability spectrum. Also, I will draw several conclusions for the prospects of a national Iraqi government controlling a unified Iraq. The second article will then use this framework and these conclusions to discuss possible approaches to shifting Iraqi society rightward on the political-stability spectrum to regain stability. The second article will also discuss the partitioning and federalization of Iraq as an alternative to the single state model.
A fundamental prerequisite for an effective democracy is that the parties involved must be willing to compromise and seek consensus. If, however, the parties cannot compromise, as can be observed in Iraq, the government becomes virtual and incapable of providing services to its citizenry. Upholding law and order being the most elementary of these. This is the current state of Iraqi politics. The strong sectarian resentments between the Sunnis and the Shiites are rooted in an approximately 1,350-year-old feud over the true disciple of the prophet Muhammad. In addition, there exists the tribal animosity between the Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds and their splinter sects. All this hostility now finds itself unchecked and manifests itself daily on the streets of Iraq. In the political arena, the system has become gridlocked. Such unwillingness to compromise due to embedded conflict has thrown Iraqi politics into a state of polarized pluralism. This political phenomenon can be described as a situation in which there are too many parties with opposing views striving to control the government. As a result, no party is willing to compromise because of the fear of losing power and influence. Each party plays to its own constituents and is consequently applauded for upholding extremist policies and refusing compromise. Such polarized pluralism is further exacerbated by the demographic makeup of Iraq.
The three major sects, the Sunnis (~30%), the Shiites (~60%) and the Kurds (~10%) are disproportionately represented in Iraq. Any hope of putting together a popular majority government is therefore dismal because the Shiites would automatically win a majority and gain control of Iraq. Undoubtedly, this would be unacceptable for Sunnis and Kurds. In summation, the sectarian feud and the tribal strife in Iraq as well as their uncompromising conditions have lead to polarized pluralism in the political system and violence in the streets. Iraq will not soon be able to successfully implement a democratic government.
Iraq’s modern history has no democratic heritage. Following WWI, the British gained control of the territory of Iraq from the Ottoman Turks and instated King Faisal as its occupational ruler. In 1932 Iraq gained its independence from the British and in the same year its leader, King Faisal died. His successor, King Ghazi ruled until 1939, but his rule was often troubled by attempted military coups. Next came the government of Rashid Ali, but that too lasted only until 1941 when the British once again invaded Iraq over issues of oil. Iraq was again granted its independence in 1947 with the British instating the Hashemite Monarchy. By 1958 the Hashemite Monarchy had come to its end and thereafter, several successive military coups led by the Iraqi Army resulted in a series of short-term dictatorial governments. Finally, in 1968 Saddam Hussein al-Majid al-Tikriti ascended to power. This too happened by way of a military coup. Historically speaking, democracy in Iraq has never blossomed, so for what reason should it prosper spontaneously in three short and conflicted years?
This brings me to a discussion of US policy in Iraq. The Bush Administration’s original plan was to instantaneously shift Iraq further rightward on the political-stability spectrum. While still maintaining stability, the Americans thought that they could compel Iraqis to compromise and create a functioning democratic state. However, this line of reasoning was naïve because of the foreseeable Iraqi reluctance to compromise. The problem was further aggravated by the US’s decision to oust all Baath party officials from the former Iraqi government and military under Saddam Hussein following the country’s occupation. As a result, Iraq found itself without any functioning government. But instead of patiently waiting for a new one to be erected, Iraqis retreated to the safety of their tribal networks and began functioning extra-governmentally. This has resulted in the abrupt slip of Iraqi society to the left on the political-stability spectrum. So if stability must be regained and the shift cannot be completed collectively and democratically, what options remain?
What must be avoided is a further slip to the left by Iraqi society on the political-stability spectrum. Currently, the only factor holding Iraqi society in a state of semi-civil war is the American military presence. If the US exits under the current conditions, Iraq will be left in a power vacuum. This would likely result in full-scale civil war and possible military interventions by neighboring counties such as Iran and Syria looking to influence the outcome of a post-war Iraq. Furthermore, large-scale refugee dispersions into neighboring countries would place these nations under immense stress and worsen the already catastrophic humanitarian crisis. International oil supplies would be further negatively affected, generating a possible international economic recession. In other words, this scenario is extremely frightening. If all else fails, the US military must contain the conflict within Iraq’s borders. Moreover, it is important to note here, that if Iraq were to implode into full-scale civil war, the discussion contained in this article will most probably be irrelevant due to the unpredictable outcomes of such a scenario.
So the option that remains is the regrettable reality of an autocratic government. So far, it has been the only form of government that has persevered throughout the course of Iraqi history. This is due to the fact that autocratic governments supplied with sufficient resources have been able to quell the sectarian divisions within the country through the use of violence. To maintain stability over a given territory, autocrats are presented with two options. The first is to make political concessions; the second is to apply terror. Given the dismal success rate of democratic Iraqi compromise, terror is historically the preferred means. That is why an autocratic government finds itself in the middle of Iraq’s political-stability spectrum. Although not approaching the moral desirability of the democratic right of the spectrum, the autocratic government has provided a relative degree of stability for Iraq in the modern age.
Such stability does however come at a significant humanitarian cost. Two examples that immediately come to mind are the 1982 Hama Massacre in Syria and Saddam Hussein’s chemical attack on the Kurdish city of Halabja in 1988. The Hama Massacre transpired as follows. A domestic uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood of Hama, Syria was not well received by President Assad. In response, he ordered that Hama be besieged, pummeled with artillery, and subsequently infiltrated. The death toll of the massacre was estimated at 20,000 persons. Surely not all were involved in the uprising. But who they were did not matter as much as the message the massacre sent to the remainder of Syrians. Similarly, Saddam Hussein’s chemical attack on the Kurds, which killed an estimated 10,000 persons, was an attempt to reestablish his political dominance by force. Much like in Syria, in Iraq stability and violence are not mutually exclusive.
In conclusion, the establishment of a functional state in Iraq will result in a positive shift to the right by Iraqi society on its political-stability spectrum. This is what must be accomplished to end the senseless bloodshed. Unfortunately, to achieve stability and maintain Iraq as a single entity, more atrocities are to be expected. An in depth discussion of the options available to achieve this rightward shift will be presented in the next article.
The final conclusions for the analysis of Iraq’s political-stability spectrum are the following. First, democracy in Iraq will not work for now due to polarized pluralism. Iraqi society’s inability to compromise has gridlocked the virtual, US imposed, “democratic” state and caused Iraqi society to slip into a state of instability and semi-civil war. Second, Iraqi society must not slide further leftward along its political-stability spectrum. The civil war must be contained within the borders of Iraq as much as possible. Third, an autocratic government is the only form of government that has been able to control Iraq and offer a relative degree of stability, albeit at the regrettable humanitarian cost of such a regime. This is the context within which a constructive rightward shift for Iraq will be discussed in the following article.
Welcome to International Intelligencer!
Greetings! This blog is an analog to the print version of International Intellgiencer, a publication featuring opinion/analysis articles about current foreign affairs. Our first issue is out now on Oberlin College campus, so pick up a copy. All articles from the printed issues will also be posted in this blog along with other tidbits that are exclusive to the blog.
The first issue features articles from Oberlin Students, however, participation is not limited to just Oberlin Students. Please contact angad.singh@oberlin.edu and andrew.brooks@oberlin.edu if you wish to submit an article, a letter, or anything else.
We look forward to your comments!
The first issue features articles from Oberlin Students, however, participation is not limited to just Oberlin Students. Please contact angad.singh@oberlin.edu and andrew.brooks@oberlin.edu if you wish to submit an article, a letter, or anything else.
We look forward to your comments!
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