Where Iraq Stands by Claudio Guler

Unfortunately, a political stability spectrum figure that is included in the print version of the article failed to transfer into this blog. I trust the article to still be understandable.
-Angad Singh

It has become abundantly clear that US policy and objectives in Iraq following the military invasion in March of 2003 have failed. The aggregate result has been a shift to the left by Iraqi society along its political-stability spectrum (figure above). The American ideological dream of compelling Iraq to shift rightward now appears incompatible and has led to a virtual government on the right of the spectrum, when Iraqi society actually finds itself on the left. In response to such a lack of substantiated government, Iraqis are retreating to the security of their tribal networks. This transition has invigorated the sectarian violence formerly existent in both the religious and the tribal realms.

This article, the first of a two part series, aims at presenting a framework of the current Iraqi situation on a political-stability spectrum. Also, I will draw several conclusions for the prospects of a national Iraqi government controlling a unified Iraq. The second article will then use this framework and these conclusions to discuss possible approaches to shifting Iraqi society rightward on the political-stability spectrum to regain stability. The second article will also discuss the partitioning and federalization of Iraq as an alternative to the single state model.

A fundamental prerequisite for an effective democracy is that the parties involved must be willing to compromise and seek consensus. If, however, the parties cannot compromise, as can be observed in Iraq, the government becomes virtual and incapable of providing services to its citizenry. Upholding law and order being the most elementary of these. This is the current state of Iraqi politics. The strong sectarian resentments between the Sunnis and the Shiites are rooted in an approximately 1,350-year-old feud over the true disciple of the prophet Muhammad. In addition, there exists the tribal animosity between the Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds and their splinter sects. All this hostility now finds itself unchecked and manifests itself daily on the streets of Iraq. In the political arena, the system has become gridlocked. Such unwillingness to compromise due to embedded conflict has thrown Iraqi politics into a state of polarized pluralism. This political phenomenon can be described as a situation in which there are too many parties with opposing views striving to control the government. As a result, no party is willing to compromise because of the fear of losing power and influence. Each party plays to its own constituents and is consequently applauded for upholding extremist policies and refusing compromise. Such polarized pluralism is further exacerbated by the demographic makeup of Iraq.

The three major sects, the Sunnis (~30%), the Shiites (~60%) and the Kurds (~10%) are disproportionately represented in Iraq. Any hope of putting together a popular majority government is therefore dismal because the Shiites would automatically win a majority and gain control of Iraq. Undoubtedly, this would be unacceptable for Sunnis and Kurds. In summation, the sectarian feud and the tribal strife in Iraq as well as their uncompromising conditions have lead to polarized pluralism in the political system and violence in the streets. Iraq will not soon be able to successfully implement a democratic government.

Iraq’s modern history has no democratic heritage. Following WWI, the British gained control of the territory of Iraq from the Ottoman Turks and instated King Faisal as its occupational ruler. In 1932 Iraq gained its independence from the British and in the same year its leader, King Faisal died. His successor, King Ghazi ruled until 1939, but his rule was often troubled by attempted military coups. Next came the government of Rashid Ali, but that too lasted only until 1941 when the British once again invaded Iraq over issues of oil. Iraq was again granted its independence in 1947 with the British instating the Hashemite Monarchy. By 1958 the Hashemite Monarchy had come to its end and thereafter, several successive military coups led by the Iraqi Army resulted in a series of short-term dictatorial governments. Finally, in 1968 Saddam Hussein al-Majid al-Tikriti ascended to power. This too happened by way of a military coup. Historically speaking, democracy in Iraq has never blossomed, so for what reason should it prosper spontaneously in three short and conflicted years?

This brings me to a discussion of US policy in Iraq. The Bush Administration’s original plan was to instantaneously shift Iraq further rightward on the political-stability spectrum. While still maintaining stability, the Americans thought that they could compel Iraqis to compromise and create a functioning democratic state. However, this line of reasoning was naïve because of the foreseeable Iraqi reluctance to compromise. The problem was further aggravated by the US’s decision to oust all Baath party officials from the former Iraqi government and military under Saddam Hussein following the country’s occupation. As a result, Iraq found itself without any functioning government. But instead of patiently waiting for a new one to be erected, Iraqis retreated to the safety of their tribal networks and began functioning extra-governmentally. This has resulted in the abrupt slip of Iraqi society to the left on the political-stability spectrum. So if stability must be regained and the shift cannot be completed collectively and democratically, what options remain?

What must be avoided is a further slip to the left by Iraqi society on the political-stability spectrum. Currently, the only factor holding Iraqi society in a state of semi-civil war is the American military presence. If the US exits under the current conditions, Iraq will be left in a power vacuum. This would likely result in full-scale civil war and possible military interventions by neighboring counties such as Iran and Syria looking to influence the outcome of a post-war Iraq. Furthermore, large-scale refugee dispersions into neighboring countries would place these nations under immense stress and worsen the already catastrophic humanitarian crisis. International oil supplies would be further negatively affected, generating a possible international economic recession. In other words, this scenario is extremely frightening. If all else fails, the US military must contain the conflict within Iraq’s borders. Moreover, it is important to note here, that if Iraq were to implode into full-scale civil war, the discussion contained in this article will most probably be irrelevant due to the unpredictable outcomes of such a scenario.

So the option that remains is the regrettable reality of an autocratic government. So far, it has been the only form of government that has persevered throughout the course of Iraqi history. This is due to the fact that autocratic governments supplied with sufficient resources have been able to quell the sectarian divisions within the country through the use of violence. To maintain stability over a given territory, autocrats are presented with two options. The first is to make political concessions; the second is to apply terror. Given the dismal success rate of democratic Iraqi compromise, terror is historically the preferred means. That is why an autocratic government finds itself in the middle of Iraq’s political-stability spectrum. Although not approaching the moral desirability of the democratic right of the spectrum, the autocratic government has provided a relative degree of stability for Iraq in the modern age.

Such stability does however come at a significant humanitarian cost. Two examples that immediately come to mind are the 1982 Hama Massacre in Syria and Saddam Hussein’s chemical attack on the Kurdish city of Halabja in 1988. The Hama Massacre transpired as follows. A domestic uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood of Hama, Syria was not well received by President Assad. In response, he ordered that Hama be besieged, pummeled with artillery, and subsequently infiltrated. The death toll of the massacre was estimated at 20,000 persons. Surely not all were involved in the uprising. But who they were did not matter as much as the message the massacre sent to the remainder of Syrians. Similarly, Saddam Hussein’s chemical attack on the Kurds, which killed an estimated 10,000 persons, was an attempt to reestablish his political dominance by force. Much like in Syria, in Iraq stability and violence are not mutually exclusive.

In conclusion, the establishment of a functional state in Iraq will result in a positive shift to the right by Iraqi society on its political-stability spectrum. This is what must be accomplished to end the senseless bloodshed. Unfortunately, to achieve stability and maintain Iraq as a single entity, more atrocities are to be expected. An in depth discussion of the options available to achieve this rightward shift will be presented in the next article.

The final conclusions for the analysis of Iraq’s political-stability spectrum are the following. First, democracy in Iraq will not work for now due to polarized pluralism. Iraqi society’s inability to compromise has gridlocked the virtual, US imposed, “democratic” state and caused Iraqi society to slip into a state of instability and semi-civil war. Second, Iraqi society must not slide further leftward along its political-stability spectrum. The civil war must be contained within the borders of Iraq as much as possible. Third, an autocratic government is the only form of government that has been able to control Iraq and offer a relative degree of stability, albeit at the regrettable humanitarian cost of such a regime. This is the context within which a constructive rightward shift for Iraq will be discussed in the following article.