Issue 3 and the Evolution of International Intelligencer

The third issue of International Intelligencer has been posted and I am proud to say, it is the best to date. In other exciting news, the project has come under new direction with two Oberlin College students, Sam Cassanos and Claudio Guler, who are working hard to get the new issue out. The name of the journal has also been changed to International Dialogue and will be undergoing cosmetic changes as well. The new blog can be viewed at www.intdial.blogspot.com and will be updated regularly with commentary, links, video clips, etc.

Interview with Professor John Mueller by Brian Pugh

John Mueller is the Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center of Ohio State University. His latest book, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them, was deemed “accurate, timely and necessary,” by the New York Times Sunday Book Review. The following interview was conducted by Brian Pugh and the views presented do not necessarily reflect those of anyone involved with the International Intelligencer.

Q: Some people argue that one of the reasons we have not had a terrorist attack in the US in more than five years is that American Muslims are well integrated and therefore are less likely to sympathize with radicals. There is considerable bitterness among Muslims in Europe, symbolized by the 2005 riots in France. Would you say that in the long run Europe is in greater danger of al-Qaeda terrorism?

A: The 9/11 hijackers stayed away from the Muslim community because that is the lamppost under which the FBI is looking for its lost keys.

If you were doing something big-planning for the next big attack, you would stay away from the Muslim community. The situation in France is not the same. They rioted because they were discriminated against. They wanted to join society. The French case is evidence that terrorism is not prevalent. If terrorism is so easy to do and there are all these discontented Muslims, why isn't there terrorism in France?

Q: Would you agree with the argument that CIA veteran Michael Scheuer made in the book, Imperial Hubris, that al-Qeada's main grievance is with Western involvement in the Muslim world and the belief that there is a systematic effort to oppress Muslims?

A: Yes. The main thing is they don't like American foreign policy in the Middle East. It is what we do, not who we are. The reporter Jim Fallows for the Atlantic Monthly said that there may be security specialists who do not think this, but he hasn't met one yet. However, I would disagree with Schuerer on some things.

Q: Like his call for the "Shermanesque" total war?

A: And that the bodies would be stacked like cord wood. His argument that our survival is at stake-I disagree strongly with that.

Q: Last year John Mearsheimer, from the University of Chicago, and the Academic Dean of the Kennedy School of Government, Stephen Walt, wrote a working paper on the Israel lobby's influence on American foreign policy that was very controversial. Would you count the "Israel lobby" as part of what you call the "terrorism industry" which exploits national security fears in the US?

A: One thing they say fairly strongly is that the Iraq War would not have taken place without the Israel lobby. That doesn't seem clear to me at all. It seems that the Iraq War could have happened without it, though the lobby contributed. I think the environment after 9/11 played a much bigger role. If you were in favor of the Iraq war, you would use 9/11 as a pretext. In as much as the Israel Lobby was for the war, they used it. With anything like 9/11, people who have agendas will use it. They would be crazy not too.

Q: When it comes to domestic policy, there are rival interest groups, like labor unions and business, that counteract each other. Is there anything like that in terms of foreign policy? Are they are any natural allies against the terrorism industry?

A: There may be. I'm trying to find them. I'm going to talk to a group associated with FEMA. I thought I would be walking into the lion's den, but someone told me that the FEMA people are outraged by what they think of as the wasting money on terrorism instead of disaster preparation. At least in theory, the Democrats, because the terrorism issue is bad for them. The greater the public anxiety about terrorism, the worse their electoral prospects are. I've also found a lot of people agree with me and say "I'm glad you said this," especially people that fly a lot, and economists, but I'm not sure if that's a natural constituency or not.

In 2004, Kerry and Bush both accidentally said something right about terrorism before backing away from their statements. Kerry said he wanted to get it back to where it was before 9/11, where terrorists are not the focus of our lives. Bush said something similar and the campaigns jumped all over each other for these statements. Zbigniew Brezinski is the most influential person to speak out on this. Some people in the press have done some things. After the FBI arrested alleged al-Qaeda terrorists in Miami, Richard Cohen in the Washington Post said, "come on, these guys are a bunch of lunies." They said they were going to launch a ground offensive against the US. They might have been dangerous, but to take them seriously as a threat to the US is ridiculous.

Q: If terrorism has been overblown, what is the greatest threat facing the United States? Nuclear proliferation? Global Warming?

A: Nothing right now is much of a threat. There are problems, but no threats. Probably the biggest is China trying to get Taiwan back. Certainly, keeping control over the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a good idea. I don't see anything I would call a threat, there are problems and potential problems. Global warming is something I would see as worth spending time on and trying to get a policy handle on. It's really tricky. 60 Minutes said that to do it seriously, you have to think about nuclear power. If you do everything possible in the US and it's whiped out by new cars in India, then you are just spinning your wheels. Before spending a lot of money and effort, those things should be nailed down as much as possible. Gregg Easterbook has written about this: with human ingenuity, technology has a way of compensating. If the incentives are right, people will adapt.

Q: Changing gears a little, why isn't there more international conflict? Samuel Huntington predicted a "Clash of Civilizations," John Mearsheimer wrote an essay, "Back to the Future", where Europe would suffer instability after the Cold War and that France and Germany would once again become geopolitical rivals, and Noam Chomsky predicted that America and other industrial countries would become locked in great power-style competition. Why haven't these theories been realized?

A: They're wrong. The whole idea that Germany or Japan would naturally want to become nuclear powers never struck me as convincing. What they want is to be rich and fat and wouldn't get nuclear weapons unless they were threatened. There aren't that many international wars. There have been civil wars, but those have mostly come to an end without new ones popping back up. Depending on definitions, the only war going on in the world right now is in Iraq. That isn't to say a lot bad things aren't going on like in the Sudan. Ethnic cleansing is not war, though it may be worse than it. Because one bad thing goes away they all don't go away. As my editor put it, "John, you maybe right, but I still have faith in my fellow man."

Compensatory Injustice: A Critique of Affirmative Action in India by Angad Singh

Caste politics is an extremely divisive issue in India, and with good reason. Historically, untouchable castes were forbidden from entering the temples in which the general populous worshiped, were prohibited from obtaining water from the community well, and if even their shadow came across that of a Brahmin, the latter would have to purify himself. Many of these untouchables, or dalits as they are more commonly known, were largely forbidden entrance into schools and jobs and forced into menial labor thereby perpetuating a cycle of poverty.

In recent times, however, it is not entirely clear to me how entrenched caste is. It is my impression, which is by no means fact, that caste discrimination is largely absent in more cosmopolitan areas, such as large cities. However, I do not doubt that it is prevalent in many rural areas. One of the most important programs the Indian government has put in place to redress caste injustice is affirmative action, or the reservation system.

Affirmative action in India has a long history, dating back to British rule. Since the British Raj, a total of 22.5% of all seats in government service (the Indian Civil Service) and government run education, are reserved for untouchable castes and tribes. This quota has been codified in India’s Constitution and is required by law. In 1990, prime minister VP Singh broadened these quotas, recommended by the Mandal Commission, to include what are known as other backward classes (OBCs), and demanded that 27% of government seats be allotted to them, on top of the 22.5% allotted to dalits and scheduled tribes, thereby mandating that 49.5% of all government seats in the civil service and state education be reserved for certain types of historically discriminated castes. Since that time, the extended quotas have been hotly debated and many demonstrations have broken out both for and against reservations. The issue has been so emotional that several students in the past have resorted to self-immolation in protest of the reservation system.

While there needs to be a redress of caste discrimination, these government mandated quotas go to far and are a ham-handed approach to a nuanced problem. Firstly, isn’t it bizarre that in order to redress the problems of societal caste discrimination, the government would institutionalize such discrimination? It seems unfair to hold the caste of a member of a “forward” caste against him or her. This seems contradictory and this institutionalization of caste only makes caste a more salient factor in societal relations and enflames passions as is obvious by pro and anti reservation demonstrations.

Also, there is evidence to suggest that in many cases, people of lower caste who are ranked lower in the academic ladder than a higher caste get preference for admittance into higher-level government funded education. Arun Shourie, an Indian politician and journalist, has claimed that in many instances, lower caste candidates get accepted with much lower academic standing and entrance exam scores than more meritorious candidates of “forward” castes. Such a policy will no doubt tend to dilute the academic quality of India’s institutes of higher learning.

However, the government is intent on extending these reservations. In fact, the central government amended the Constitution in 2005 to pave the way for government legislation mandating state schools to adopt the extra 27% quota for OBCs and the amendment explicitly says the government can force private schools to obey this quota as well.

The claim that reservations dilute intellectual standards in schools is something even the government agrees with. Witness the Central Educational Institutions (Reservations in Admission) Act of 2006 that was enabled by the 93^rd amendment to the Constitution as discussed above. The Reservations in Admissions Act demands that higher education state funded schools enact the 27% quota for OBCs yet explicitly exempts certain “institutions of excellence, research institutions, institutions of national and strategic importance” such as the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology, the National Brain Research Centre, and others. While the law explicitly does not state why these institutions are exempt from the OBC quota, the fact that these institutions are deemed of national and strategic importance imply that personnel in these places ought to be India’s best and brightest. By excluding certain institutions, the government implicitly acknowledges that the quota system leads to greater intellectual mediocrity yet are still adamant in expanding the system into premier IT and medical universities.

This is not to say that all members of backwards castes do not perform as well as those from forward classes, however, it seems in general that due to the lack of candidates from backward castes, government bureaucrats are forced to accept lower ranking members of “backward” castes and that often means “backward” caste candidates of lower academic rank. On the other side, reservations means that “forward” caste candidates have to compete more rigorously as there are fewer available seats.

The problem ought to be redressed at the primary school level. Insofar as education is essential toward social mobility, the Indian government ought to reform primary school education. To my knowledge, the higher-level state universities in India are quite good while primary school is in terrible shape, an unfortunate circumstance. That is why reform at this level is needed. Perhaps this can be done through government, yet if not, a more market-oriented approach is needed where government subsidizes educational entrepreneurs in starting a private school. Once competition in this sector grows, tuition fees will likely decrease and for those who still cannot afford it, government ought to give vouchers that will promote school choice for poverty stricken families so they can choose to send their children to either agricultural or vocational schools to immediately improve economic conditions, or if possible, send them to a school where English, economics, and IT are emphasized, admittance being dependant on merit, of course.

By abandoning the inefficient reservations system and focusing on basic education and perhaps anti-poverty programs, the government can help redress not only the problem of poverty due to caste discrimination, but poverty in general insofar as this pernicious inequality cuts across caste lines.

One and the Same: Functional Chaos in Rome and Beyond by Claudio Guler

Over spring break, I had the opportunity to visit my sister in Rome. The call for new articles for our next issue had come in shortly before break and I thought it would be interesting to write on something I observed while there. But what, if anything, does life in Rome have to do with international politics?

For the EU, Rome has many associations. It was there that over half a century ago the treaty that gave birth to the concept of a united Europe was signed. This connection is unambiguous. But in the spirit of Italian uncertainty, I wanted to find something more abstract. How else could Rome relate? Could I discover a more distant connection? It turns out the writing was on the wall.

Life in Rome – and for that matter in much of Italy – is chaotic and often exercised in an ad hoc fashion. Anarchy is too harsh a word to describe the situation, but allusions to its presence can be observed. As both a student of international relations and a citizen of Italy, Rome’s modus operandi is too difficult for me to rationally comprehend in some standard model of organization. There are simply too many unstructured and unexpected events occurring simultaneously. The only manner in which I can explain its continuing existence and fortitude is as functional chaos – a system lacking in ordained rationale.

That which can be accomplished in most of the western world in a few simple steps almost always requires a few supplemental ones in Rome. Where in most developed societies, interactions among individuals are well defined and regulated by the law, in Rome almost everything is negotiable. There, like on the international stage, the law is often more nominal than practical. I have observed this most noticeably in two realms: domestic politics and traffic relations.

Rome, the home of Italian politics is an epicenter of political confusion. Political scientists have diagnosed Italy with polarized pluralism. Under such a system, there exist too many splinter parties along a political spectrum. In order to retain power, each party plays to its own constituency and refuses compromise. The result is political gridlock. Laws are negotiated and passed, however, their binding quality – not to mention their enforcement – is almost always in question. Therefore, if none of your neighbors are adhering to them, why should you encumber yourself? This is exemplified by what in Italy is called l’evasione fiscale or fiscal tax evasion. Although no one knows precisely, it is estimated that more than 50% of anticipated taxes are not collected.

Similarly, traffic relations in Rome work much in the same manner. For example, certain red lights must be observed, while others can be considered optional. This appears extremely dangerous, but where order doesn’t prevail, situational awareness does.

On my last day in Rome, unannounced protests shut down a large portion of the city’s transportation network. Since buses were no longer a good option, I opted for a taxi. I found a police officer and asked him where I could find one. His colloquial response was as follows: “Look…there is one now unloading some passengers. He isn’t supposed to pick you up on the side of the street like this, but if you can get him to do it, hop in.” Unfortunately by the time I had gotten to the taxi he had already driven off. But never mind the taxi, wasn’t that a police officer that just recommended me to break the law?!

Examples of functional chaos can be witnessed on a daily basis in the international arena. Each time a state acts in defiance of international law it is by definition functioning outside a system of ordained rationale. This happens to come about quite often. There is no supranational governing authority and as a result, functional chaos has stepped in to fill the void.

Therefore, Rome, much like the international arena, is fundamentally governed by functional chaos. It appears to be reasonably self-regulating. In both spheres there exist laws and customs – both written, as well as unwritten – yet in the end, the individual’s or the state’s will reigns supreme. That which restricts each entity and forces it to conform is the existence of the other and its own will.

This must all seem horribly pessimistic. But, there is after all something rather reassuring about this condition. Although it takes some time to get used to functional chaos (I often need to assimilate when returning to Italy), it is in the end – well, functional. With a little patience and some nonchalance, it can be endured and out of it grows an exciting and spontaneous society unmatched in utilitarian novelty.

Thus, if we hold true that both Rome and the international arena are fundamentally governed by functional chaos, and, we consider Rome to be a successful example of permanence, then the prospects for the future of international society appear encouraging. Hopefully we will continue to codify our interactions and adhere to our agreements, but until then, Rome may provide a relevant working model.

Chessmaster Turns to Politics by Andrew Brooks

Throughout his brilliant professional chess career, Russian Garry Kasparov has involved himself in Soviet and Russian politics. Since his retirement in 2005 from the World Chess Federation, the former World Champion has stepped into the international spotlight. While his celebrity has come from his abilities in the game of chess and not from his political message, he stands to become an influential figure in Russia’s future. His arrest in April of this year has created controversy, bringing Russian human rights and free speech abuses to the fore of international news.

His accomplishments in chess are vast. After becoming a Grand Master at the age of only 17, he catapulted into highest circles of world chess, winning the title of World Champion five years later at the age of 22. The youngest World Champion in history, he also increased his rating to become the highest rated player in the world at the age of 23. He is the only player to have earned a rating higher than that of Bobby Fischer, chess champion in exile and American Cold War chess hero. This development came in 1990, and, though Kasparov left the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) later that year, was a point of Soviet pride in the final years before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kasparov is also well-known for his victory in 1996 over Deep Blue, IBM’s super-computer chess machine, and subsequent loss to the smarter Deeper Blue in 1997. He lost the title of World Champion to fellow Russian Vladmir Kramnik in 2000, but kept his position as highest rated in the world until his retirement in 2005. He cited an inclination towards writing and Russian politics, which he saw as “misguided.”

Kasparov began his political participation in 1984, when he joined the CPSU. By 1987, he was elected to the Central Committee of the Komsomol, or “Communist Union of Youth.” Throughout the 1990s, Kasparov involved himself in the Russian democracy movement. After leaving the CPSU in 1990, he helped create the Democratic Party of Russia. Three years later, he helped create a coalition of parties advocating democracy, called the “Choice of Russia” bloc. In 1996, Kasparov campaigned for Boris Yeltsin, former Russian president.

While part of his record is pro-democratic, his more recent political involvement and overall political participation is mixed. His involvement with the “The Other Russia” coalition has drawn criticism from those who accuse the coalition of including parties like the National Bolshevik Party and the Workers’ Party, who oppose the democratically elected government. Other accusations assert that the coalition contains fascist, nationalist, and far-left elements. He has faced personal criticism and occasional violence for his political leanings, including eggs thrown by Putin supporters, and a blow to the head with a chessboard by a Russian who disagreed with him.

In Russian political circles, Kasparov has gained the title of gadfly during Russia’s post-Soviet period, and particularly during the years after his retirement from chess in 2005. Often followed by the Federal Security Service (FSB), Kasparov has noted that he is under suspicion of “extremist activity.” He once complained, “I don't even understand what the G8 means because the G7 stood for seven great democracies, which Russia is not.” In late 2006 and in March of 2007, he helped organize a string of demonstrations opposing President Putin and St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Matviyenko’s policies. In mid-April he was arrested on his way to a rally in Moscow, briefly held by police, and fined the equivalent of approximately 40 US dollars. “Today, the mask came off the Putin police state,” he said. “They are violating the Constitution. It's obvious the regime is nervous and unstable if this is how they react to a nonviolent march.”

While Kasparov himself was not injured in the event, many others, some elderly, were beaten, arrested, and interrogated, drawing attention from all major international media. The event allowed Kasparov to use his celebrity to bring criticism of Putin’s policies affecting free speech and to win international legitimacy for Russia’s anti-Putin democracy movement. Kasparov has said that there is a national debate on democracy and free society and that he and those Russians who advocate democracy are winning. While Russian officials would like to keep Kasparov and his political allies muzzled, and have taken steps to do so, Kasparov has vowed to continue raising eyebrows.

The Mecca Agreement in a Regional Context by Sam Cassanos

Over a year has passed since the watershed Palestinian Authority (PA) parliamentary elections that brought Hamas to power. The sources of Hamas’ success, often wrongly explained in America as an expression of the Palestinian people’s opposition to the two-state solution, was actually attributable to the group’s pragmatic evolution. Hamas was able to exploit Fateh’s disunity, reputation for corruption, and inability to negotiate independence in a victory that has possibly weakened commitments within Hamas to its founding ideology.

However, after forming a government, Hamas fell victim to the same international forces that have drained Fateh of its credibility. The United States and the European Union requested that the government officially adopt the PLO’s platform (unilateral recognition of Israel, obey past PLO-Israel agreements, and adhere non-violence) before it could receive aid or partake in diplomatic relations.

After a year of deprivation and violence, between both Hamas and Fateh and with Israel, a unity government finally formed this past February with the help of Saudi Arabia’s mediation. This so-called Mecca Agreement grants Hamas nine ministers, to Fateh’s six, in a new cabinet that will staff the coveted interior, finance, and foreign ministerial portfolios with independents. The agreement also obliges Hamas to respect past PLO-Israel accords. These conditions are favorable to Hamas, and now thanks to a nonpartisan Saudi aid and renewed US and EU donations to Fateh ministries, Hamas will be the majority party in an operational new government. On top of that, it resisted international pressures and ultimately only had to publicly acknowledge what it had already done: decided to work within the institutions of the Palestinian Authority.

The Mecca Agreement is a good place to start in order to examine the regional implications of Hamas’ victory. While the most popular lens used to explain current Middle Eastern politics focuses on an allegedly expanding transnational Iranian influence, or a developing “Shia crescent,” the future of American imperialism in the region is probably just as much if not more threatened by the example of Hamas, a party with its origins in the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) that was able to unseat a US-Israeli ally, Fateh, in a democratic election. A similar situation exists across the border in Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood holds 88 out of 454 seats in the parliament. The MB bloc, while too small to pass legislation, has according to an article in Middle East Report made a habit of “proactive study of political issues and use of parliamentary procedure to hold the government’s feet to the fire” thus transforming the group into “the nation’s only real political party.” This is occurring at time when the National Democratic Party (NDP), and the government it dominates, have become profoundly alienated from the Egyptian people. In one dramatic example, the government could only safely distribute frozen chickens to the homeless victims of a fire by dispatching them over a ten-foot gate.

The NDP’s internal problems should be coupled in an analysis with their foreign policy. When these elements are looked at together, they expose the precariousness of the NDP and American power in the Middle East. Cairo makes itself useful to the US by serving as an interlocutor for it and Arab governments. Both the US and Egypt believe that as the first Arab state to make peace with Israel and as a state that saw its lifeline extended by seeking rapprochement with Jerusalem and Washington, Egypt can guide and encourage other nations to follow its example. Furthermore, as a negotiator in intra-Arab disputes, Egypt can promote US interests. However, over the past year Egyptian mediation has failed to put an end to internal Palestinian violence, produce a PA government acceptable to the US and Israel, or free the Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, who was captured by Palestinian militants last June. The NDP has persistently warned the US that it must do more to acknowledge Palestinian rights and assuage their grievances or face an intensifying regional instability. But this is not the role that the US wants its client to play. In short the emergence of Hamas and the Egyptian MB as viable parliamentary candidates is actively devaluing the NDP as an American ally.

Last year’s PA elections set off a chain of events that diminished Egyptian and Jordanian efficacy as mediators but enhanced Saudi Arabia’s international influence. The political impasse between Hamas and Fateh following the elections and the inflated fears of Iranian expansion into the Levant-Middle East drew Saudi Arabia further into Palestinian politics. Riyadh proved capable of using its wealth and influence to create a PA government that did not meet the expectations of the US, EU, or Israel but which the former two are forced to tolerate and work with albeit in a qualified way. Thus a declining American hegemony, marked by the degeneration of Fateh and the NDP, has allowed the Saudi’s increased leverage in the Levant.

This new influence extends not just over other Arabs but to the United States as well. As the only intermediary able to unify Fateh and Hamas, Saudi Arabia’s political goals in Palestine cannot be easily dismissed or opposed by anyone. Furthermore, as concern grows over Iranian influence projected through Hezbollah, the Iraqi Shia, and Hamas, Saudi Arabia’s image in Israel has been revised. For the reasons the kingdom was feared, its oil wealth, substantial military spending, Islamist identity, and close relationship with America, Saudi Arabia now appears as a useful ally against Iranian power.

In the wake of Hamas’ victory, when Iranian donations to the controversial new government received widespread media attention, conventional thinking incorporated these events into a pre-existing narrative of Iran’s regional ascendancy. But as with much of the commentary on the “Iranian threat” the fear of a Hamas-Iran alliance was overblown and the election and the events that followed weakened America’s hegemony in the region for reasons that have little to do with Iran. As of right now, the Palestinian-Saudi relationship dwarfs in monetary value and political import any relationship between Hamas and Tehran. What has happened in Palestine mirrors developments in Egypt.

America’s allies have spoiled their reputations and Islamist parties, by moving towards the center and by practicing honest government, are able to capitalize on these circumstances. At the risk of instability and state breakdown, these forces will have to be accommodated. That Hamas and the MB in Egypt have entered democratic process is of inestimable value to the Palestinians, Egyptians, and even to the United States. Their experiences as parliamentarians will prepare them with necessary skills in governance, promote political moderation, deepen their relationships with civil society, and introduce them to the contours of international politics. If the US insists that its allies remain in power and the Islamists be marginalized, the consequence is an erosion of the current officialdom and the institutions that can prepare the region and the world for a democratic co-existence of secular and religious parties.

The Modern Kurdistan by Ali Kurdistani

For some of you, the title of this article may seem strange as it is not clear what “the modern Kurdistan” means exactly. Kurdistan may not seem modern because of two reasons: first, the Kurds do not have an independent state yet, Second, should a completely independent Kurdish state include parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran or only include Iraqi Kurdistan, the region that Iraqi Kurds currently control and are therefore more independent than other Kurds in the Middle East?

The history of the Kurdish people is complex. The big powers of the early 20th century divided the Kurds and their land among four Middle Eastern states, Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. The lives of those Kurds were shaped under the rules of those states and even their thought and culture was influenced by Persian, Turkish, and Arabic influences in those countries in which they are still living in today.

Because of dividing the Kurdish people among those states, the Kurds living under foreign governments with hostile policies against the Kurds, could not unite and work together to get their own rights as the people of other Middle Eastern nations did.
In my view, the modern Kurdistan means the current Iraqi Kurdistan and this region, in my view, will determine the future of the Kurds in the Middle East.
Since the Iraq War, Iraqi Kurdistan has made progress in different aspects and those political and economic changes that have happened and are happening in Iraqi Kurdistan are also influencing other Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Syria.

Since Saddam's regime has been removed from power, the Kurdish issue has become an important national and international political issue as more and more people around the world are focusing on what is going on in Iraqi Kurdistan.
The Kurdistan regional government (KRG) within Iraq is the only Kurdish government in the Middle East and in the world as it represents the Kurdish voice and Kurdish interests. The KRG does not only represent the Kurds within Iraq, but it also represents Kurds worldwide although it cannot and has no right to interfere in regional states that contain a Kurdish population.

Sometimes, those regional states of Turkey, Syria, and Iran allege that Kurds are interfering in their internal affairs and making problems for them but this is untrue, because these governments have always made and continue to make problems for the Kurds within their countries and for the Kurds in Iraq as well.

It is known around the world that the Kurds do not have their own independent state yet but they do have the Kurdish independent government within Iraq. It's true that this government is not one-hundred percent independent, but it’s a Kurdish government representing Kurdish rights and interests, and therefore it's natural if the KRG and the Kurds within Iraq help the Kurdish people worldwide, as all states and governments around the world help their own people everywhere.

The Kurdish situation is really different than any other issue in the region because the Kurds do not have an independent state yet, and therefore Kurds need to help each other. The Kurdish situation is like the Jewish situation in the early 20th century. Just as Jews around the world united and helped each other to establish their own independent state, Kurds ought to do the same.

The Kurdish people and government of Iraqi Kurdistan are helping the Kurds in the region directly and indirectly, since in the last few years, many Kurdish individuals and families from Iran, Syria, and Turkey have moved to Iraqi Kurdistan and are continuing to do so, especially after Saddam’s removal. Those Kurds are living, working, and studying in Kurdish homes, Kurdish jobs, and Kurdish schools under native Kurdish rule.

This migration is happening after Saddam's removal because during his rule, the Kurds within Iraq and the Middle East could not help each other and collaborate because of the hostile rogue state policies against the Kurds. Due to these policies, the Kurdish people within Iraq and other regional states could not understand each other’s problems. For example, Kurds within Iraq had little relations with the Kurds in Turkey except for a few individuals, they were not knowledgeable and familiar about the Kurdish question within Turkey and vice versa.
I have met some Kurds from Turkey who have no knowledge of what Saddam did against the Kurdish people in the town of Halabja in 1988 (Saddam attacked Halabja with chemical weapons killing many people). This lack of understanding was also true of Kurds in Iran and Syria.

Another major obstacle for Kurds to understand their mutual problems in the Middle East is the presence of different Kurdish written and oral dialects. For example, the Kurds of Turkey and Syria write with a Latin alphabet and speak in what is called the Kurmanji dialect, but the Kurds in Iraq and Iran write with the Arabic alphabet and speak in the Sorani dialect, therefore it is really difficult for Kurds to understand each other if they live in different countries.
But I as I mentioned before, many Kurds from Iran, Syria, and Turkey have moved into Iraqi Kurdistan after the beginning of the Iraq War and as a result of employment at governmental and non-governmental institutions, Kurds are now learning each other’s dialects and are developing a mutual understanding and social cohesion.

Iraqi Kurdistan has become the headquarters of Kurdish national and political movements and Kurdish opposition parties from Iran, Syria, and Turkey have offices in Iraqi Kurdistan. These parties are getting support from Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Most of the Kurdish people within Iran, Syria, and Turkey are sympathetic to the Kurdistan regional government and its leaders despite the presence of their own political parties and leaders. But now that Iraqi Kurdistan is becoming the general Kurdish headquarters and its leaders are becoming the leaders of the Kurds in the Middle East in general, the modern Kurdistan is unifying Kurdish political, security, and economic projects in the Middle East.
In my view, without the support of the West, and especially the American people and government, a modern Kurdistan will not be a success in terms of economic, security, cultural and educational factors.

The modern Kurdistan still needs a lot of changes and more modernization and this will not happen without the knowledge of experience. The Kurds need a lot of guidance which they have to take from modernized Western countries to further modernize the Kurdish political, economic, educational and legal institutions.

One has to realize an important point: a modern Kurdistan will be the most pro-American country in the Middle East, and the Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan will be the best friends of the American and European people.

As a Kurd from Iraqi Kurdistan, I would recommend that Kurdish young free thinkers should work with American free thinkers to promote modernization and global values in the modern Kurdistan. And in other ways the modern Kurdistan needs more internationalization in all aspects especially in terms of education to educate the new Kurdish generation on international laws, international relations, and international ideas.